











As signaled by its participation in the G-20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 
China is gaining significant influence over international tax rules. Yet, how exactly China intends 
to shape international tax law remains an open question, even amongst leading Chinese tax 
scholars. As both a major capital importer and exporter as well as a developing economy with 
tremendous global economic power, China does not fit neatly into the traditional dichotomies of 
the international tax regime. This article argues that China’s international tax policy is likely to 
be strongly influenced by its unique system of state capitalism. Both the history of Chinese 
domestic tax reforms and the Communist Party’s current mechanisms of control over the Chinese 
economy suggest that China’s tax policy cannot be understood separately from its system of state 
capitalism. This article contends that as a result, China is likely to adopt distinctive international 
tax policies including maintaining a worldwide system of corporate taxation, providing tacit state 
support for international tax planning by major Chinese multinationals, and negotiating for broad 
exemptions in tax treaties for state-associated entities. If not proactively addressed by OECD 
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In May 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted an international forum highlighting 
China’s Belt and Road initiative—a multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure plan spanning over 60 
countries and roughly one-third of the global economy.1 Chinese leaders have labeled it “the 
project of the century” and state media outlets have described it as ushering in “Globalization 
2.0.”2 China is already the world’s largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis), largest 
manufacturer, largest exporter, largest trading nation, and largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves.3 Consequently, Western observers have interpreted the initiative as a concerted effort to 
reshape the global economic order and rewrite the rules on international trade and investment.4  
One month later, the international tax regime witnessed a major milestone in what has been 
described as the “most extensive attempt to change international tax norms since the 1920s.”5 On 
June 7, 2017, over 70 jurisdictions signed an innovative multilateral convention modifying the 
signatories’ existing bilateral tax treaties.6 The convention represents the culmination of a four-
year project, known as BEPS, spearheaded by the G-20 and the OECD to combat base erosion and 
profit shifting. 7  This multifaceted project, which also developed recommended measures for 
countries’ domestic tax laws, seeks to better ensure corporate profits are taxed “where substantive 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jessica Meyers, Globalization 2.0: How China’s Two-Day Summit Aims to Shape a New World Order, 
L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-belt-road-2017-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/XX89-7GEC]; Jane Perlez & Keith Bradsher, Xi Jinping Positions China at Center of New Economic 
Order, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/world/asia/xi-jinping-one-belt-one-road-
china.html [https://perma.cc/Z3UP-SUM9]. 
2 Charles Clover, Sherry Fei Ju & Lucy Hornby, China’s Xi Hails Belt and Road as ‘Project of the Century,’ FIN. 
TIMES, May 14, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/88d584a2-385e-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23 
[https://perma.cc/D2DQ-3UP9]; China's Belt and Road Initiative Ushers in ‘Globalization 2.0,’ PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE, Apr 13, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-04/13/content_28909176.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YM9W-Z8GB]; Belt and Road Initiative Strives to Reflect ‘Globalization 2.0,’ CHINA DAILY, March 
26, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/26/content_28683281.htm. [https://perma.cc/2G7M-
GQXZ]. 
3  See Wayne M. Morrison, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, 
Challenges, and Implications for the United States (2015); see also Noah Smith, Who Has the World's No. 1 Economy? 
Not the U.S., BLOOMBERG (Oct 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-18/who-has-the-world-
s-no-1-economy-not-the-u-s (discussing the relevance of purchasing power parity in comparing the U.S. and Chinese 
economies). 
4 See Michael Holtz, Trumpeting ‘One Belt, One Road,’ China Bids to Lead ‘Globalization 2.0,’ CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR (May 16, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2017/0516/Trumpeting-One-
Belt-One-Road-China-bids-to-lead-Globalization-2.0 [https://perma.cc/9WXK-8PEW]; see also Meyers, supra note 
1. 
5 Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 1140 (2016); see also Itai Grinberg 
& Joost Pauwelyn, The Emergence of a New International Tax Regime: The OECD’s Package on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS), ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct 28, 2015), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/24/emergence-
new-international-tax-regime-oecd%E2%80%99s-package-base-erosion-and#_ednref2 [https://perma.cc/Y534-
7FVN] (“A new international tax regime is emerging ….”). 
6  ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent BEPS, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ground-breaking-multilateral-beps-convention-will-close-
tax-treaty-loopholes.htm [https://perma.cc/BUJ4-ZDJ6]. 
7  See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/ [https://perma.cc/RSM5-7HVF]. 
 
80                                                                                                                                         [Vol.10:1 
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW 
economic activities generating the profits are carried out and where value is created.”8 While many 
leading scholars are skeptical of the “patch-up” or “band-aid” nature of the project’s substantive 
tax rules, 9  the project represents a notable change in the institutional framework for tax 
diplomacy.10 The Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD, a small group of mostly rich countries, 
has long served as the leading forum for international tax reform and more recently as “an informal 
world tax organization,” often to the dismay of developing countries.11 However, as part of BEPS, 
the entire G-20, including non-OECD members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, 
were allowed to participate “on an equal footing” with OECD members.12 
These developments portend a major role for China in shaping future international tax rules. 
Over the past decade, many have predicted that China would eventually assume meaningful 
influence over the international tax regime.13 Following China’s participation in the BEPS project, 
it appears China has now made the transition “from a norm-taker to a norm-shaker.”14 In assessing 
its engagement, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Haiyan Xu concluded that China “actively participated 
in both developing and implementing the BEPS project.”15 Jinyan Li has similarly reasoned that 
China’s BEPS efforts, “are likely to have significant implications for the development of 
international tax system.”16 Those analyzing the institutional structure of the international tax 
regime have likewise suggested that going forward China and the BRICS will have a “significant” 
impact on tax policy reform.17 Yariv Brauner, for instance, has argued that any meaningful policy 
reforms will require cooperation from China and India and that these countries are positioned to 
                                                 
8 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Explanatory Statement OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6VL-U2ZR]. 
9 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY 271 (2016); Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 
(2014); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 10 ERASMUS L. REV. 3 (2017); New Rules, Same Old 
Paradigm, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21672207-plan-curb-
multinationals-tax-avoidance-opportunity-missed-new-rules-same-old [https://perma.cc/47XR-L4LF]. 
10 See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 5, at 1146.  
11  Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal “World Tax Organization” Through National 
Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006); see infra Part 2.A.  
12  ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), BEPS- Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm [https://perma.cc/RR25-6TE6]; see Diane M. Ring, 
Developing Countries in an Age of Transparency and Disclosure, 2016 BYU L. REV 1767 (2017). Whether the 
inclusion of these large emerging countries in fact enhances the legitimacy of the project remains contested. See, e.g., 
Sissie Fung, The Questionable Legitimacy of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, 10 ERASMUS L. REV. 76 (2017). 
13 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD's Campaign 
Against “Harmful Tax Competition”, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 56 (2012-2013) (“China’s role will be critical in the 
future … since China's interests in international finance differ significantly from OECD members’ interests.”); 
Thomas Ecker & Jieyin Tang, Business Profits (Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14 OECD), in EUROPE-CHINA TAX TREATIES 
78 (Michael Lang, Jianwen Liu & Gongliang Tang eds., 2010) (“[O]wing to its increasing importance in the world 
economy and the growing sophistication of the Chinese tax system, China will also likely play an important role in 
shaping international tax norms in the next century.”). 
14 Jinyan Li, China and BEPS: From Norm-Taker to Norm-Shaker (Osgoode Legal Stud., Research Paper Series 
126, 2016), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=olsrps 
[https://perma.cc/Q52A-7FGP]. 
15 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, China and the Future of the International Tax Regime (Law & Economics 
Working Papers 140, 2017), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/140 [https://perma.cc/8833-8E5B]. 
16 Li, supra note 14. 
17 See, e.g., Ring, supra note 12, at 1793.  
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potentially “break the dominance of the OECD in the international tax regime.”18 In short, while 
many debates remain as to the future of the international tax regime, it appears that China will 
certainly play a significant role. 
However, the existing literature on China and the international tax regime offers limited 
insight into the types of reforms Chinese policy-makers may seek. Extensive scholarly literature 
exists on the divergent international tax preferences between developed and developing 
countries—preferences illustrated in part by the OECD and UN model tax treaties respectively.19 
However, international tax scholars have almost completely ignored the ways in which China’s 
unique system of state capitalism may influence its international tax policy.20 In fact, Wei Cui and 
Ji Li appear to be the only English-language scholars to have considered the complex relationship 
between Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and Chinese international income taxation. Yet, 
Cui’s work has focused primarily on assessing competing theoretical justifications for taxing SOEs 
and Li’s on empirical questions regarding their tax compliance.21 As a result, foundational matters 
remain unresolved, including “the objectives of international tax policy” for “countries that are 
home to many SOE multinationals.”22 Existing scholarship on the implications of Chinese state 
capitalism for U.S. law has likewise failed to consider the implications of SOEs for international 
income taxation.23 
This gap in the international tax literature is particularly jarring in light of the fact that the 
dramatic growth in Chinese outbound investment over the past two decades has been dominated 
by SOEs.24 Recent policies, including the Belt and Road Initiative and a 2017 crackdown on 
private-sector outbound investment, suggest the Chinese government intends for SOEs to maintain 
                                                 
18 Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, The BRICS and the Future of International Taxation, in BRICS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION, supra note 12, at 517; Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath 
of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 973, 1026 (2016). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 51-57; REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, OMRI MARIAN & NICOLA SARTORI, GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON INCOME TAXATION LAW 166 (2010); Donald. R. Whittaker, An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and 
U.N. Model Tax Treaties: History, Provisions and Application to U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 
39 (1982). 
20 See generally Kelle S. Tsai & Barry Naughton, State Capitalism and the Chinese Economic Miracle, in STATE 
CAPITALISM, INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTION AND THE CHINESE MIRACLE 11 (Barry Naughton & Kellee S. Tsai eds., 2015) 
(suggesting seven defining characteristics of modern Chinese state capitalism); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We 
Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 
(2013) (describing the unique “relational ecology” of Chinese state capitalism composed of deep connections between 
SOEs and the Party-state). 
21 Their scholarship is discussed in detail at Part 5 infra. 
22 Wei Cui, Taxing State-Owned Enterprises: Understanding a Basic Institution of State Capitalism, 52 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 775, 810 (2016). 
23 For instance, Lin and Milhaupt discuss potential implications for the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process, the federal securities law disclosure regime, 
the antitrust regime, and bilateral investment treaties, but make no mention of international tax law. See Lin & 
Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 757-758; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State 
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 708-16 (2015) (discussing the implications of Chinese state 
capitalism for international antitrust, anticorruption, and anti-subsidy law with respect to purportedly private Chinese 
firms). 
24 See infra Part 4.B. 
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their leading role in China’s overseas investment.25 Scholarly critiques of the Chinese system of 
SOE governance and of the centrality of SOEs in Chinese outbound investments are both forceful 
and plentiful.26 However, rather than engaging in debates about the overall soundness of China’s 
system of state capitalism, this paper proceeds on the premise that SOEs will remain integral to 
the Chinese economy and outbound investment for the foreseeable future.27 If so, how may the 
distinctive features of Chinese state capitalism shape the objectives of China’s international tax 
policy and thereby impact the future of the international tax regime? 
This paper argues that China’s system of state capitalism may lead it to pursue a set of 
international tax policies and norms that diverge from those currently sought by OECD nations. 
First, due to the prominence of SOEs in its outbound investment, China may favor and successfully 
maintain a robust system of worldwide corporate taxation despite a general trend amongst 
developed countries towards territorial systems.28  Second, due to Chinese tax administrators’ 
strong incentive to assist Chinese SOEs in minimizing their foreign taxes paid, China may provide 
tacit state support for SOE tax planning, complicating the government’s role in tax diplomacy.29 
Finally, Chinese international tax policy is likely to provide preferential treatment to SOEs in 
domestic regulations and seek to expand preferential exemptions for SOEs in bilateral treaties.30 
By pushing for a reconceptualization of sovereign immunity in taxation, China may create a new 
pressure point for tax competition between countries seeking to attract Chinese direct investment.  
These arguments are advanced as follows. Part 2 analyzes international disagreements 
regarding three key fault lines in the international tax regime: 1) the allocation of taxing rights 
between source and residence countries, 2) OECD efforts to combat tax competition, and 3) base 
erosion and profit shifting. Part 3 traces the evolution of China’s system of business taxation and 
argues that Chinese international tax policy stands at an inflection point with the existing literature 
providing limited insight on its future direction. Part 4 highlights the ways in which the central 
government maintains extensive control over the Chinese economy through its direct influence 
over SOEs and capital controls. Part 5 contends that these features of Chinese state capitalism may 
lead China to challenge the current international tax regime by pursuing a set of distinctive 
international tax policies and norms. Finally, Part 6 offers concluding thoughts and considers the 
impacts of such policies on OECD countries. 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Lucy Hornby, Chinese Crackdown on Dealmakers Reflects Xi Power Play, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/ed900da6-769b-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691 [https://perma.cc/P4NM-XU5P]; Tom 
Mitchell & Gabriel Wildau, China’s State Council Puts Seal on Capital Controls, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/3a638d1c-8405-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff [https://perma.cc/AUX6-DR6K]; see also Wu 
Gong, SOEs Lead Infrastructure Push in 1,700 ‘Belt and Road’ Projects, CAIXIN (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-05-10/101088332.html [https://perma.cc/7D88-ERY3] (“About 50 Chinese 
state-owned corporate giants have invested or participated in nearly 1,700 projects in countries along the new Silk 
Road routes over the past three years.”), 
26 See, e.g., Ligang Song, Jidong Yang & Yongsheng Zhang, State-owned Enterprises’ Outward Investment and 
the Structural Reform in China, 19 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 38 (2011); see also CHENYANG XIE, THE LEGAL REGIME 
OF CHINESE OVERSEAS 85 (2015) (“China should restrict outward overseas investment by State-owned enterprises 
through legislation”). 
27 See infra Part 4.B. 
28 See infra Part 5.B.  
29 See infra Part 5.C.  
30 See infra Part 5.D.  
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II. FAULT LINES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
A. Allocation of Taxing Rights 
Before considering how China’s system of state capitalism may impact the objectives of 
its international tax policy, it is instructive to first survey three key points of disagreement between 
developed and developing countries regarding the current international tax regime. Only after 
considering the major fault lines over international tax policy does the significance of China’s 
unique position in tax diplomacy—as an emerging economic power with significant SOE-
controlled capital outflows—become clear. 
The first, and arguably the most important, area of divergence is the allocation of taxing 
rights between source and residence countries. When a resident of country A earns income in 
country B, both countries may legitimately claim the right to tax these earnings. Country A, the 
residence country, may assert taxing jurisdiction since it is where the income recipient resides or 
where a corporate taxpayer has its place of incorporation or management.31 Country B, the source 
country, may assert taxing jurisdiction since it is where the income is earned.32 Thus the “essential 
dilemma of international taxation” is resolving the competing claims of residence and source 
jurisdictions.33 Much ink has been spilled over whether residence or source countries have a “better” 
right to tax earnings,34 and over the worldwide efficiency impacts of residence or source taxation.35 
Yet, self-interested countries have generally been unwilling to entirely forgo taxation of income 
earned by their residents abroad or by nonresidents within their borders. This can create double 
taxation, as earnings may be taxed twice, once by the residence country and once by the source 
country. While one country can unilaterally take steps to limit the burden of double taxation on its 
residents through the use of foreign tax credits, exemptions, or deductions, bilateral solutions are 
preferred.36 Unilateral action requires a residence country to subordinate its tax claims over foreign 
income to source country claims, without any guarantee from the source country of reciprocity or 
of an upper limitation on taxes imposed. Moreover, unilateral exemptions can result in double non-
taxation.37     
As a result, a network of over 3,000 bilateral tax treaties has developed to govern the 
taxation of cross-border business and investment.38 While the modern scope of bilateral tax treaties 
                                                 
31 See generally Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1336 (2001) (discussing justifications of resident country taxation); Omri Marian, 
Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2013) (analyzing the concept of corporate residence). 
32 See, e.g., Peggy B. Musgrave, Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to 
the European Union, quoted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 6 (2003). 
33 GRAETZ, supra note 9, at 11. 
34 For brief review of the literature, see VERONIKA DAURER, TAX TREATIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12-17 
(2014); GRAETZ, supra note 32, at 5-12. 
35 For a discussion and critique of the principles of Capital Import Neutrality and Capital Export Neutrality, see 
GRAETZ, supra note 9, at 93-98. 
36 See, e.g., Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1603, 1610 
(2016).  
37 See id. at 1612. 
38 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 99-
106 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (providing an estimate of 2,500 treaties as of 2009); see also Brian 
 
84                                                                                                                                         [Vol.10:1 
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW 
has expanded, the foundational purpose of these treaties has been preventing double taxation.39 
Scholars have considered these treaties as constituting an “international tax regime,” as the treaties 
are “meaningfully standard” and “largely similar in policy.”40 In particular, this network of treaties 
reflects what has been labeled the “1920s compromise.” As provided for in the 1928 League of 
Nations model bilateral income tax treaties, the primary right to tax active business income is 
allocated to the source jurisdiction while the primary right to tax passive investment income is 
allocated to the residence jurisdiction.41 A form of this compromise has been embedded in both 
the OECD and UN model treaties—which serve as the starting points for modern international tax 
treaty negotiations. 
As the presence of two competing model treaties indicates, despite the “1920s compromise” 
the allocation of taxing rights still remains a pressure point in the international tax regime. In 
signing a bilateral tax treaty, each country reduces its source-based claims on income earned by 
non-residents within its borders. For the source-based claims preserved by treaty, the residence 
country promises to avoid double taxation by providing a tax credit or exemption to its residents 
for income earned in the source country.42 Thus, the more source-based claims preserved in a 
bilateral treaty the greater the allocation of taxing rights to the source country; the fewer preserved, 
the greater the allocation to the residence country. Generally, when a set of countries has balanced 
bilateral investment flows, each is a source country roughly as often as it is a residence country, 
so both are willing to give up significant source-based claims.43 Thus the OECD model treaty, 
which originated amongst a set of developed countries assumed to have relatively balanced 
investment flows, allocates taxing rights primarily to the state of residence. However, if one 
country receives more capital investment than it sends abroad, allocating tax rights primarily to 
the state of residence can cause the capital importing country to lose significant tax revenue. 
Because developed countries are generally exporters of capital, and developing countries importers 
of capital, the OECD model treaty—with its bias toward residence taxation—has been criticized 
as favoring developed countries over developing countries.44 As a result, the UN model treaty is 
designed to account for non-reciprocal income flows between a developed and a developing 
country by preserving more source-based claims.45 
The allocation of taxing rights is a perennial point of contention between developed and 
developing countries in bilateral treaties negotiations. During the 1940s, when efforts were 
                                                 
J. Arnold, An Introduction to Tax Treaties, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/TT_Introduction_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH46-Y3SB] (providing an estimate of 3,000 
as of 2015).  
39 See THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX GOVERNANCE 84-116 (2008). 
40 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary (Response to article by H. David Rosenbloom), 52 TAX L. REV. 167, 168-
70 (2000); Brauner, supra note 12, at 975. 
41 See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2007); GRAETZ, supra note 9, 
at 84. 
42 See DAURER, supra note 34, at 57; Christians, supra note 36, at 1613. 
43 See DAURER, supra note 34, at 23. 
44 See, e.g., Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L' L. & POL. 939 (2000). However, as further 
discussed infra at Part 3.B., the relationship between development status and capital flows can quite be complicated, 
especially for large emerging economies.  
45 See DAURER, supra note 34, at 2. 
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underway to update the League of Nations model treaties, a tax conference in Mexico attended 
mainly by Latin American countries saw the development of a model granting source countries 
“almost exclusive taxing rights.”46A few years later in 1946 a full international tax conference in 
London drafted a model more favorable to residence countries, which served as the baseline for 
most bilateral negotiations until 1963.47 Although the United Nations established a committee 
intended to continue the model tax treaty work of the League of Nations, the committee ceased to 
meet after 1954.48 As a result, the OECD became the main forum for international tax matters, 
releasing influential model treaties in 1963 and 1977, and consistent updates since 1992 in the 
form of an ambulatory model.49 The OECD model reduces source-based claims on passive income 
earned by non-residents (through lowering or eliminating withholding taxes) and retains source-
based claims on active income only for earnings attributable to a permanent establishment.50 In 
1967 the UN resumed its interest in international tax matters, creating a committee of experts 
intended to aid developing countries in bilateral tax negotiations.51 The committee published a 
model treaty in 1980, which was updated in 2001 and 2011.52 The UN model follows the same 
structure and terminology as the OECD model but preserves additional source-based claims by, 
among other things, allowing for higher withholding tax rates on passive income and providing a 
broader definition of permanent establishment.53 Elements of the UN model have been used in the 
bilateral treaties of developing countries, including China.54 However, the OECD model is said to 
“dominate the current tax treaty law.”55 Conversely, the UN model “suffers marginalization.”56 
Scholars continue to critique the distributional impacts of the OECD model, and some suggest the 
rise of the BRICS may help foster a more equitable distribution of taxing rights in future treaties.57 
B. Tax Competition 
Another major fault line in the international tax regime is the degree to which it is 
appropriate for nations to implement low rates and preferential tax policies in the hope of attracting 
foreign investment. Distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable tax competition 
                                                 
46 Id. at 56. 
47 See id. at 56. 
48 See SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM 223 (2011). 
49 See F. Alfredo Garcia Prats, Impact of the Positions of the BRICS on the UN Model Convention, in BRICS 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION, supra note 12, at 393; DAURER, supra note 34, at 56. 
50 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Dec. 18, 
2017), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-
20745419.htm [https://perma.cc/A8VN-KBQF]. 
51 See Whittaker, supra note 19, at 43-44; see also UNITED NATIONS, Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/overview.htm [https://perma.cc/6VPG-PZ38] (describing 
the history of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters). 
52 See DAURER, supra note 34, at 59; Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy: International 
Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649 (2010). 
53 UNITED NATIONS, Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (Apr. 5, 
2012), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/double-taxation-convention.html 
[https://perma.cc/V7QZ-LG99]; see DAURER, supra note 34, at 2. 
54 See infra text accompanying note 118 ; see also DAURER, supra note 34, at 255. 
55 Brauner, supra note 18, at 977; see Prats, supra note 49, at 395. 
56 Pistone & Brauner, supra note 18, at 12. 
57 See, e.g., DAURER, supra note 34, at 26-27. 
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continues to be a point of contention.58 In the 1980s, the growing number of transactions taking 
advantage of tax haven jurisdictions led tax policy-makers in OECD countries to recognize a need 
for coordinated action. Many small jurisdictions found it in their interest to offer preferential tax 
policies and low rates in order to attract an outsized share of global financial activities.59 In 
response, the OECD published a report in 1998 entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue which sought to develop criteria to identify harmful tax competition. 60  Two 
particularly notable elements of the report were its repeated invocations of the dangers of a “race 
to the bottom” amongst jurisdictions and its listing of low or zero effective tax rates as an element 
of harmful competition. Then, in 2000 the OECD released a “blacklist” of 35 uncooperative tax 
havens which were required to take measures to eliminate their harmful tax practices or risk facing 
coordinated coercive measures by OECD countries—such as the denial of deductions, exemptions, 
or credits for transactions involving the tax havens.61 A set of scholars, practitioners, and lobbyists 
vehemently criticized the OECD’s approach for providing unequal treatment of OECD and non-
OECD countries (OECD members Switzerland and Luxembourg, for instance, were not required 
to make any reforms), illegitimately impinging on national sovereignty, and advancing a negative 
view of “competition” in conflict with free market ideals.62 These allegations of illegitimacy and 
political bias coupled with the withdrawal of U.S. support, contributed to the failure of the 
initiative.63 Subsequently, the OECD shifted course from focusing on tax competition to focusing 
on combating tax evasion through information exchange.64 
Following the pushback to its initiative against harmful tax competition, the OECD adopted 
a less confrontational approach. In 2002, it released a model Tax Information Exchange Agreement 
(TIEA) designed to facilitate bilateral exchanges of information between countries without 
requiring the signing of comprehensive bilateral tax treaties. 65  This tax-transparency agenda 
initially witnessed limited success, with less than 25 TIEAs signed through 2007.66 However, 
                                                 
58 See Christians, supra note 36, at 1630. 
59 See RIXEN, supra note 39, at 131-42; Morriss & Moberg, supra note 13. 
60 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 
(1998). 
61 See Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last War on Tax Havens, 116 TAX NOTES 327 (2007).  
62 See Richard Woodward, A Strange Revolution: Mock Compliance and the Failure of the OECD’s International 
Tax Transparency Regime, in GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE 109 (Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen eds., 2016); Allison 
Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 99 (2009). 
63 See Markus Meinzer, Towards an International Yardstick for Identifying Tax Havens and Facilitating Reform, 
in GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE, supra note at 62, at 259; see also Paul O’Neil, Statement on OECD Tax Havens (May 
10, 2001), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po366.aspx [https://perma.cc/SEC3-CNSC] 
(“The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or system should be, and 
will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems. The United States simply has no interest in stifling 
the competition that forces governments—like business—to create efficiencies.”). 
64 See Nicholas Shaxson & John Christensen, Tax Competitiveness—A Dangerous Obsession, in GLOBAL TAX 
FAIRNESS 287 (Thomas Poggee & Krishen Mehta eds., 2016); Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on 
Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 703 (2009). 
65  ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HC9C-BZK3]. 
66 See id.; Richard Eccleston & Helen Smith, The G20, BEPS, and the Future of International Tax Governance, 
in GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, at 179. 
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following the 2008 financial crisis, a more coercive approach was adopted. In 2009, the OECD, 
under the direction of the G-20, revealed a progress report which placed jurisdictions that had 
signed twelve or more TIEAs onto a white list, those that had committed to sign TIEAs onto a gray 
list, and those that had not taken sufficient transparency measures onto a black list.67 Echoing the 
approach toward harmful tax competition, the G-20 threatened countermeasures against 
jurisdictions not meeting tax transparency standards.68 The approach and the lists of noncompliant 
jurisdictions were not without controversy.69 Yet, by 2010, all jurisdictions were removed from 
the blacklist and by 2014 over 1,600 TIEAs had been signed.70 However, scholars suggest that the 
practical results have been limited, with many tax havens engaging in “mock compliance” by 
signing “near-useless” TIEAs amongst themselves.71 Despite the mixed record of prior multilateral 
attempts to address tax competition and evasion, calls continue for further efforts to limit tax 
competition through U.S. or OECD-led harmonization initiatives.72 
C. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
The newest pressure point in the international tax regime is the G-20/OECD BEPS project. 
Launched in 2013, the project intends to update international tax rules to address various gaps and 
mismatches utilized by corporations to artificially shift profits across jurisdictions or achieve 
double non-taxation of income.73 In 2015, the OECD produced 15 action plans concerning current 
technical challenges in international tax law.74 Reflecting a lack of consensus regarding certain 
elements of the project, most plans only offer prescriptive guidance in the form of suggested best 
practices. Some, however, provide international minimum standards to be implemented through 
either the multilateral convention or domestic legislation.75 Notably, the BEPS project lacks “even 
mild coercive measures,” with peer review as the only enforcement mechanism.76 Yet, despite the 
relatively modest aims of the project’s action plans, its future remains in doubt. The United States 
has yet to ratify the multilateral convention and the Trump Administration has expressed little 
                                                 
67 See Woodward, supra note 62, at 111-13. 
68 See id.; Grinberg, supra note 5, at 1149-51. 
69 See infra text accompanying note 129. 
70 See Eccleston & Smith, supra note 66, at 179. 
71 See, e.g., Meinzer, supra note 63, at 267, 255; Woodward, supra note 62, at 111-13. 
72  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Tenth Anniversary 
Retrospective, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 783, 793 (2009); Danielle Wenner & Kevin Zollman, How to End International 
Tax Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/opinion/ending-international-tax-
competition.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ4Q-MKPX]. 
73 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2003), 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q688-TRZU]. However some more critical 
commentators have suggested the project represents an effort to revitalize OECD initiatives against tax competition 
under a new and more technical guise; See Brauner, supra note 9, at 76-79; Joachim Englisch & Anzhela Yevgenyeva, 
The Upgraded Strategy Against Harmful Tax Practices Under the BEPS Action Plan. 5 BRITISH TAX REV. 620 (2013); 
Brian Garst, BEPS Pivotal in Fight over Tax Competition, CAYMAN FIN. REV. (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2015/08/19/beps-pivotal-in-fight-over-tax-competition/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3Y6-HFFH]. 
74  See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), BEPS Actions, , http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-
actions.htm [https://perma.cc/4ZM2-CGHP]; Christians, supra note 36, at 1623; Grinberg, supra note 5, at 1142. 
75 See Multilateral Convention, supra note 6. 
76 Grinberg, supra note 5, at 1168. 
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enthusiasm for the project.77 China, on the other hand, has rapidly implemented most BEPS action 
plans, reflecting its significant influence over the project and its interest in becoming the vanguard 
in international tax policy.78 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE TAX POLICY 
A. From Mao to the Modern Enterprise Income Tax 
China has historically played a relatively minor role in international tax diplomacy, as its 
modern system of domestic corporate taxation is of recent origin. In fact, China’s current system 
of corporate income taxation, the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) dates only to 2008. A brief review 
of the history of Chinese business income taxation puts China’s international tax policy in context 
and reveals why many aspects remain underdeveloped or in flux. It also illustrates the ways in 
which changing theories of SOE governance and administration have led to significant alterations 
in China’s business tax policy, further elucidating the underappreciated connection between 
China’s unique system of state capitalism and its tax policies.  
China’s first income tax was implemented by the Nationalist government in 1936. It 
applied to both business profits and employment income and was territorial in scope, exempting 
foreign earnings.79 Reforms in 1943 extended taxation to rental income and capital gains and 
purportedly imposed taxes on Chinese citizens abroad, while offering credit for foreign taxes 
paid—thus following the American model. Yet, during this period China was plagued by war, its 
tax administration was “in chaos,” and the central government had limited power.80 As a result, 
there is little surviving evidence on the implementation of this early attempt to tax overseas 
income.81 It was not until the mid-1990s that China would again seek to tax business income 
earned abroad.82 
In the first decade following the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the 
Communist Party transformed China into a socialist state-planned economy. Initially, 14 different 
taxes were imposed on private businesses at various stages of transactions. These were consciously 
designed to discourage private business and thus facilitate the socialist transformation.83 Thanks 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., Torsten Fensby, Will the BEPS Project Survive the Trump Administration?, TAX NOTES (May 15, 
2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/will-beps-project-
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78  See Chris Xing, William Zhang, Lilly Li & Conrad Turley, China at the Forefront of Global BEPS 
Implementation, INT’L TAX REV. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3511704/China-at-
the-forefront-of-global-BEPS-implementation.html [https://perma.cc/BD4R-ZL7Y]. 
79 See Jinyan Li, TAXATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 8-9 (1991); Wei Zhimei & Liu Jian [魏志梅 & 
刘建], Zhongguo Jingwai Suodeshui Zhi de Huigu Jiejian yu Zhanwang (中国境外所得税制的回顾、借鉴与展望) 
(China’s Overseas Income Tax System: Retrospective, Lessons, and Prospects], 7 TAX’N RES. J. 89 (2011) [税务研
究]. 
80 Li, supra note 79, at 10. 
81 See Wei Zhimei, supra note 79. 
82 See infra note 109. 
83 See Daniel H.K. Ho, Tax Law in Modern China: Evolution, Framework and Administration, 31 HONG KONG 
L.J. 141, 146-7 (2001). 
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to the expropriation of assets held by capitalists and foreign investors, by approximately 1956, the 
private sector had vanished and SOEs had become the dominant from of commercial enterprise.84 
SOEs were themselves overseen by various government bureaucracies, the most important by 
central government ministries and the smallest by departments of local governments.85 
From the mid-1950s until the start of China’s reform and opening up policy in late 1978, 
the government would experiment with various methods of transferring funds from SOEs to the 
central government. Since there were essentially no foreign entities operating in China, the 
government’s business tax policies were entirely domestic in focus.86 At first, in the early 1950s 
SOEs were required to hand over nearly all profits to the central government under a system of 
direct state administration of income and expenses. However, across the 1950s and 1960s, SOEs 
were able to maintain a small portion of profits under either the “enterprise bonus system” (in 
which SOEs could retain any surplus over target levels set by the central government) or the 
“profit-contracting system” (in which SOEs would retain a pre-determined percentage of total 
enterprise profits). The particular system in place vacillated with the political winds.87 
In 1978 China saw the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up policy, 
allowing for foreign investment and market reforms. In order to attract capital, China adopted 
income tax regimes offering preferential treatment to foreign direct investment.88 The Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Venture Income Tax and the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax both offered 
generous tax incentives including tax holidays and reinvestment refunds.89 The first applied to 
equity joint ventures between a foreign investor and a Chinese partner and had the most generous 
incentives, while the second applied to other foreign direct investments.90 In 1991, these two 
regimes were combined with the introduction of the Foreign Income Tax law providing uniform 
treatment for all foreign invested enterprises.91 Across the 1990s effective tax rates for foreign 
invested enterprises were much lower than for domestic enterprises.92 Scholars have generally 
                                                 
84 See Li, supra note 79, at 11; Ho, supra note 83, at 147; Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate 
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concluded these tax incentives were effective in helping to attract much needed foreign 
investment.93 
The Reform and Opening Up policy also witnessed changes in the theory of SOEs 
governance and a concomitant alteration in the taxation of domestic enterprises. Following the 
start of Reform and Opening Up in 1978, SOEs were given more authority to make independent 
business and personnel decisions.94 In order to give greater financial incentives to SOEs, the 
government began to experiment with the reform of “from profit to tax.” Starting in 1984, SOEs 
became subject to income and regulatory taxes.95 Large- and medium-sized SOEs were statutorily 
subject to a 55 percent income tax rate, but in practice the amount of taxes paid was often 
“determined on a negotiated basis between the SOEs and the central government” rather than based 
“on taxing actual profits.”96 Small domestic private enterprises now allowed as part of market 
reforms were also taxed on their earnings, but under an entirely separate regime.97  
Following Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1992 Southern Tour, highlighting the success of 
China’s initial market reforms, the central government enacted further reforms to SOE governance 
and taxation. 98  In 1993, the government passed a comprehensive corporate law and in the 
following year oversaw corporatization of 100 major SOEs as part of an effort to enhance their 
competitiveness.99 Corporatization would continue across the 1990s, with large and medium-sized 
SOEs consolidated into government-owned corporate groups and small SOEs privatized.100 That 
same year, China also promulgated new tax regulations, which applied the same tax rules and rates 
to all types of domestic enterprises. The new rules reduced the statutory tax rates on SOEs to 33 
percent from 55 percent, but also eliminated the deductions and areas of regulatory discretion that 
SOEs had taken advantage of under the prior system.101 Moreover, SOEs and other domestic 
                                                 
93 See id. at 681-86; Qun Li, Tax Incentive Policies for Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China and their Influence 
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large Chinese SOEs). 
100 See Wang, supra note 84, at 646; Zhong, supra note 94, at 106; see also We Are the Champions, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/2495172 [https://perma.cc/5YMK-F8RD] (describing Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji’s doctrine of zhuada fangxiao or “grasp the big, let go the small” regarding SOE restructuring). 
101 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Zanxing Tiaoli [中华人民共和国企业所得税暂行条例] 
(Provisional Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax) (promulgated by the State Council., Nov. 26, 1993, effective Jan. 
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[https://perma.cc/B5JP-3X65] [hereinafter Domestic Enterprise Income Tax Regulations] (China); see Lam supra 
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enterprises were subject to the same statutory tax rate as foreign invested enterprises, although 
foreign enterprises were still eligible for preferential incentives and favorable deduction rules.102  
After 26 years of maintaining separate tax regimes for domestic and foreign enterprises, 
China promulgated a unified Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) in 2007.103 This ended the tax incentive 
regime for foreign investment and imposes a uniform tax rate of 25 percent on all business 
activity.104 Thus, for the first time, EIT provides equal tax treatment for domestic and foreign 
enterprises. However, it makes available a 15 percent tax rate and preferential deductions for 
companies that qualify as “high new technology enterprises.” 105  American enterprises have 
accused the regulations regarding HNTE status of having “de facto bias against foreign companies,” 
as they require core IP to be owned by the entity seeking HNTE tax treatment.106 
Under the EIT, China taxes resident enterprises on their worldwide income and offers a 
foreign tax credit for income taxes paid in foreign countries.107 China’s system of worldwide 
enterprise income taxation traces its origin to the 1993 Domestic Enterprise Income Tax 
Regulations, which applied to income from sources both within and outside of the country.108 In 
1997 the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) published regulations that 1) reaffirmed that 
domestic enterprises were subject to Chinese taxation on foreign income and 2) permitted domestic 
enterprises to credit foreign taxes when calculating their taxable foreign income.109  The EIT 
maintains this basic approach and codifies the foreign tax credit into law.110 Under the EIT, a 
Chinese resident enterprise can claim a direct credit for foreign income taxes paid.111 Additionally, 
on the receipt of dividends from a foreign subsidiary, it may also claim an indirect credit for income 
taxes paid that are attributable to the dividends received—subject to some controversial 
limitations. 112  While resident enterprises are generally not taxed on the profits of foreign 
subsidiaries until the receipt of dividends, the EIT contains a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) 
provision, under which a resident enterprise may be required to include its share of undistributed 
                                                 
102 See CAO, supra note 95, at 11. 
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profits from a CFC, if the effective tax rate on the CFC is less than 12.5 percent.113 In 2009, the 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT) published regulations regarding the foreign tax credit 
under the EIT—addressing many fundamental issues, such as the character of creditable foreign 
taxes and the calculation of the indirect credit.114  
B. China’s International Tax Policy and Diplomacy at a Crossroads 
The relatively recent development of China’s Foreign Tax Credit and CFC rules reflects 
the fact that China’s international tax policy currently stands at a crossroads. From the start of 
reforming and opening up in 1978 until quite recently, China’s international tax policy closely 
reflected its status as a capital importer. Yet, in the decade following the 2008 global financial 
crisis Chinese outbound investment increased dramatically and in 2015 China became a net capital 
exporter.115 As a result, Chinese international tax policy and diplomacy is gradually changing to 
reflect the country’s new role in the global economy. 
Until a decade ago, the clear objective of Chinese international tax policy and diplomacy 
has been to attract investment from developed countries while protecting source-based taxation 
claims. In the early years of reform, in addition to implementing preferential tax regimes for 
foreign investment, China also sought to conclude bilateral income tax treaties with developed 
countries.116 China concluded its first treaty with Japan in 1983 and by 1988 it had negotiated 
twenty treaties, primarily with major developed countries.117 From the Japan treaty until the mid-
1990s, China sought to negotiate on the basis of the UN model and as a result, its treaties with the 
United States and European countries generally reflect a hybrid of the OECD and UN model 
treaties.118 In particular, China insisted on a broad scope for source-based taxation claims by 
negotiating for broad permanent establishment definitions, source-country taxation of royalties, 
and source-country taxation of gains from alienation of shares.119 Commentary on the 1984 treaty 
between China and the United States, for instance, noted that the United States granted China a 
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very generous set of source-based taxation concessions in comparison to prior U.S. treaties.120 In 
order to attract foreign investment, China also sought to include tax sparing clauses in its treaties 
with developed countries.121 Under a tax sparing mechanism, the residence country credits a 
taxpayer for foreign income taxes that would have been paid but for tax holidays or incentives 
granted by the source country. Functionally, tax sparing ensured tax incentives offered by China 
to foreign investors would not be nullified by reductions in residence country tax credits—thus the 
benefit of tax incentives would flow to foreign investors rather than residence country taxing 
authorities.  
 Over the past decade China has begun to reassess its international tax policy and diplomacy 
in light of its new role as significant capital exporter. For example, as noted above, new regulations 
have been promulgated regarding the taxation of income earned abroad by Chinese resident 
enterprises.122 Moreover, Chinese tax authorities have also begun to enforce previously ignored 
international tax rules, most notably China’s CFC rules. 123  In terms of bilateral tax treaty 
negotiations, scholars analyzing China’s recent treaties suggest that it now strives to strike a 
balance between securing benefits for Chinese outbound investment and retaining “a robust 
position as a capital importer.”124 For instance, the OECD model appears to have now supplanted 
the UN model as the starting point for Chinese tax treaty negotiations.125 In particular, recent 
treaties have scaled back source taxation of business profits, indicating a shift away from its prior 
practice of staunchly defending source taxation.126  Moreover, since 2009, China has stopped 
including tax sparing mechanisms in new or amended tax treaties.127 Many of the tax sparing 
provisions in older treaties are also expiring thanks to temporal limitations or Chinese domestic 
tax reform.128 
China’s engagement with OECD-led multilateral tax initiatives further reflects an on-going 
transition in Chinese international tax policy. In the past, China had a fraught relationship with the 
                                                 
120  Critics of the treaty suggested that the foreign policy goal of gaining closer ties with China may have 
overshadowed economic considerations. See Turner & Orzem, supra note 117, at 544; Paul D. Reese, United States 
Tax Treaty Policy toward Developing Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L. REV. 369, 386, 388-91 (1987). 
121 See Ecker & Tang, supra note 13, at 36; Hu & Li, supra note 119, at 212. 
122 See supra note 114. 
123 See, e.g., Hu & Li, supra note 119, at 222-25; Xing, supra note 78; see also Wang Haijun, Zhao Hongshun, & 
Huang Hairong [王海军, 赵洪顺 & 黄海荣], Tansuo Shijian Takuan Fan Bishui Gongzuo Xin Lingyu—Shandong 
Sheng Dishui Ju Liyong Shou Kong Waiguo Qiye Fan Bishui Anli Ceji [探索实践拓宽反避税工作新领域——山
东省地税局利用受控外国企业反避税案例侧记 ] (Exploring Practices to Broaden New Fields of Anti-Tax 
Avoidance—Case Study of Shandong Provice Local Taxation Bureau Using CFC Anti-Avoidance) 3 CHINA TAX’N 
19 (2015) [中国税务] (discussing in detail the first administrative case concerning China’s CFC rules). 
124 Hu & Li, supra note 119, at 186. 
125 See Bernhard Fohls & Weizhen Guo, Capital Gains (Article 13 OECD Model), in EUROPE-CHINA TAX 
TREATIES, supra note 13, at 141-42. 
126 Jinyan Li, The Great Fiscal Wall of China: Tax Treaties and Their Role in Defining and Defending China’s 
Tax Base. 66 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 452 (2012); see also From Supporting “Attracting In” to Helping “Going Out,” supra 
note 116, at 9 (noting that in recent tax treaty negotiations China has sought to increase the time required for 
construction and assembly projects to qualify for permanent establishment status, in order to benefit Chinese 
companies engaged in construction projects abroad). 
127 See Hu & Li, supra note 119, at 208, 213. 
128 See Christian Massoner, Miao Liu, & Huifang Yang, in EUROPE-CHINA TAX TREATIES, supra note 13, at 235. 
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OECD’s initiative on harmful tax practices. For instance, China’s resistance to the inclusion of 
Hong Kong and Macau in a 2009 list of tax havens prepared by the OECD made international 
news. Reports indicated that at the G-20 Summit, the President of China wrangled with the 
Presidents of France and Germany over the listing of these regions and the fact the listing was 
controlled by the OECD rather than an organization including Chinese representation.129 President 
Obama mediated a compromise whereby Hong Kong and Macau were “relegated to a footnote.”130 
The relationship between China and the OECD appears to have improved under the BEPS project, 
as all G-20 members were reportedly “playing a full part in setting the agenda, in the discussions 
and the decision-making process.” 131  For instance, approximately 50 Chinese tax officials 
participated in the project and submitted over 1,000 comments or suggestions on China’s behalf.132 
China has also been reforming domestic regulations to bring them into line with the BEPS Actions 
Plans.133 In short, recent developments suggest that Chinese tax officials believe that the country’s 
international tax policy should better reflect its new status as a capital exporter and that China 
should take a leading role in multilateral tax diplomacy—both notable departures from prior 
practice. 
However, with Chinese international tax policy at a turning point, existing legal scholarship 
provides limited insight into what Chinese international tax policy will look like going forward. 
Officials at SAT see an opportunity for China to shape international rules and develop a “new 
international tax system with Chinese characteristics.”134 Neither English nor Chinese-language 
                                                 
129 See Eccleston & Smith, supra note 66, at 190; William Vlcek, Byways and Highways of Direct Investment: 
China and the Offshore World, 39 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF., 111, 134 (2010). 
130 See Meinzer, supra note 63, at 267. 
131 Lee Corrick, The Taxation of Multinational Enterprises, in GLOBAL TAX FAIRNESS, supra note 64, at 183. 
Some Chinese scholars however have criticized the project, suggesting that it is difficult for non-OECD members to 
contribute equally and that the OECD countries are using the project to make international rules to reflect their own 
interests. See, e.g., Zhang Zeping [张泽平], BEPS Xingdong Jihua dui Woguo Guonei Shuishou Lifa de Yingxiang ji 
Yingdui [BEPS 行动计划对我国国内税收立法的影响及应对] (Impacts of the BEPS Action Plan on Chinese 
Domestic Tax Legislation and Responses], 6 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 28 (2015) [国际税收].  
132 See PricewaterhouseCoopers China, ASIA PAC. TAX NOTES 16 (2016), https://www.pwccn.com/en/aptn/aptn-
2016-cn.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD3N-KAZL]. 
133 See, e.g., Daniel Ho, The Development of China Tax Measures for Cross-Border Intra-Group Payments in the 
BEPS Era, 41 INT'L TAX J. 47 (2015). 
134 State Admin. of Tax’n [国家税务总局], Shendu Canyu Guoji Shuishou Gaige Shuxie Daguo Shuiwu Zeren 
Dandang [深度参与国际税收改革书写大国税务责任担当] (Deep Participation in Drafting International Tax 
Reforms Assuming the Tax Responsibilities of a Great Power), (2017), 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810724/c2853451/content.html [https://perma.cc/PF3D-3U4G]; see also Chen 
Youxiang & Dong Qiang [陈有湘 & 董强], Guojian “Yidai Yilu” Zhanlüe xia de Guoji Shuishou Fengxian Yingdui 
Jizhi [构建“一带一路”战略下的国际税收风险应对机制] (Establishing an International Tax Risk Response 
Mechanism Under the One Belt One Road Strategy), 6 TAX’N ECON. J. 49 (2015) (税收经济研究) (arguing that China 
should take advantage of a period of strategic opportunity to becoming a leader in reconstructing international tax 
rules); Wan Jing [万静], G20 Yige dui Zhongguo Yiweizhe Shuxie Guoji Shuishou Xin Guize de Jiyu [G20, 一个对
中国意味着书写国际税收新规则的机遇] (G20, A Meaningful Opportunity for China to Write New Rules for 
International Taxation), LEGAL DAILY [法制日报], Sept. 5, 2016 (noting the opportunity for China to rewrite 
international tax rules). 
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scholarship has yet identified the potential distinguishing characteristics of such a system.135 In 
fact, much of recent Chinese international tax scholarship has focused on administrative 
difficulties and horizontal inequalities caused by the foreign tax credits limitations imposed in 
SAT’s initial 2009 regulations. Scholars and practitioners have criticized the application of a 
country-by-country limitation as well as limitations on indirect foreign tax credits for subsidiaries 
below the third tier, arguing such limitations place undue burdens on Chinese multinationals with 
complex corporate structures.136 In late 2017 SAT finally addressed these criticisms, allowing 
corporations to choose to use an aggregate limitation and to claim indirect foreign tax credits for 
additional tiers of subsidiaries.137 Other potential reforms anticipated by scholars and practitioners 
are further regulations regarding China’s CFC rules 138  and additional information exchange 
agreements with tax havens.139 In light of recent U.S. tax reform efforts, some scholars have also 
argued that China should consider lowering its enterprise tax rate140 and gradually replacing its 
                                                 
135 See Deng Liping [邓力平], Cong “Xianshi Ban” Dao “Shengji Ban” Goujian Zhongguo Tese Guoji Shuishou 
de Sikao [从“现实版”到“升级版” 构建中国特色国际税收的思考] (From “Reality” to “Improvements” Thoughts 
on Constructing International Taxation With Chinese Characteristics), INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 6, 9 (2014) [国际税收
] (arguing that Chinese scholars should explore possibilities for a Chinese international taxation policy embodying 
“the strategy and style of a Great Power” and reflecting China’s goal of “national rejuvenation”). 
136 See, e.g., XIE, supra note 26, at 69; Chen Youxiang, supra note 134; Wang Jincheng & Sun Yahua [王金城 
& 孙亚华], Wanshan Shuishou Dimian Zhidu Cuijin Qiye Duiwai Touzi [完善税收抵免制度促进企业对外投资] 
(Perfecting the Tax Credit System to Promote Enterprise Foreign Investment), 7 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA (2011) [涉外
税务]; Zhang Yunhua & Ren Yanhe [张云华 & 任言和], Wanshan Shuishou Di Mian Zhidu Zhu Tui Qiye “Zou 
Chuqu” [完善税收抵免制度助推企业“走出去] (Improving Tax Credit System and Promoting Enterprises “Going-
out”), 6 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 72 (2015) [国际税收]. For an overview of similar debates in the United States over 
the appropriate mechanism for limiting the foreign tax credit under I.R.C §904(d), see, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, A 
Hitchhiker's Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. Rev. 391 (2003). 
137 Wanshan Qiye Jingwai Suodeshui Shou Di Mian Zhengce Wenti de Tongzhi [完善企业境外所得税收抵免
政策问题的通知 ] (Circular on Perfecting the Policy on Tax Revenue from Overseas Income of Enterprises) 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and Taxation Administration, December 28, 2017, effective January 1, 2018), 
Cai Shui [2017] No. 84; see also Khoonming Ho & Lewis Lu, China: Inbound and Outbound Investment Incentives 
Kick Off, INT’L TAX REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3784113/China-New-
inbound-and-outbound-investment-incentives-to-kick-off-2018.html [https://perma.cc/HN9S-3J5L] (noting the 
option for corporations to apply “onshore pooling” rather than “country baskets” for calculating foreign tax credit 
limitations). 
138 See, e.g., Mark Melnicoe, In China, More Advance Rulings, More Cases Going to Court, BLOOMBERG TAX 
MANAGEMENT TRANSFER PRICING REPORT (May 31, 2016), https://www.bna.com/china-advance-rulings-
n57982073273/ [https://perma.cc/C6K9-DCGJ] (“Current CFC rules in China are murky, making it hard to assess 
whether an offshore company is really engaged in active business and how to prove there is a commercial need to 
keep its profits overseas …. But changes are likely coming…”); Dongmei Qiu, Collecting Unpaid Tax Offshore: 
Caribbean Tax Havens and Foreign Direct Investment in China, 12 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 648, 659 (2014); see also 
Zhang Wei & Huang Ying [ 张巍 & 黄莹], Guoji Bishuidi, CFC Fagui yu Zhongguo Jingji [国际避税地， CFC法
规与中国经济] (International Tax Havens, CFC Rules and the Chinese Economy), 9 TAX’N RES. J. 53 (2012) (税务
研究) (proposing changes to Chinese CFC Regulations). 
139 See, e.g., Hu & Li, supra note 119, at 220. 
140 See Gong Huiwen (龚辉文), Guoji Shuishou Jingzheng Shi Xiandai Shuizhi Gaige de Zhuyao Tuidongli (国
际税收竞争是现代税制改革的主要推动力) [International Tax Competition as a Main Driving Force of Modern 
Tax Reform], 9 TAX’N RES. J. 14, 19 (2017) (税务研究). 
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foreign tax credit system with an exemption system.141  Although these recent and suggested 
reforms are of significance, they all fall well within current international tax norms and practices. 
Thus, this paper instead primarily focuses on ways in which China’s unique system of state 
capitalism may lead it to pursue distinctive international tax policies. 
IV. Defining Features of Chinese State Capitalism 
A. SASAC Governance of Chinese SOEs 
Since the beginning of Chinese economic reforms in 1978, scores of Western observers 
have anticipated the eventual privatization of Chinese SOEs and a more complete transition to 
free-market capitalism.142 After decades of halting reforms, nearly all Chinese SOEs have been 
corporatized and more than two-thirds of central government-controlled SOEs now have some 
level of foreign investment. 143  As a result, it can be natural to assume that relatively little 
distinguishes Chinese SOEs from private market-oriented business enterprises. Yet, as a new wave 
of English-language scholarship reveals, while the market forces play a significant role in most 
sectors, the Party-state continues to function as the leading economic actor through its extensive 
controls over SOEs—resulting in a unique system of Chinese state capitalism.144 
In fact, both the significance of SOEs in the Chinese economy and degree of the Party 
control over major SOEs are likely to further increase under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Today, 
SOEs are estimated to still account for 30 to 40 percent of China’s total GDP, 40 percent of 
industrial assets, and 20 percent of total employment.145 Yet, Xi Jinping is actively “reversing the 
                                                 
141 See Li Tianfei (李天飞), Mei Zuixin Shui Gai Jihua Zhong “Shudi Yuanze” Pingxi (美最新税改计划中 “属
地原则”评析) [Comments on the “Territorial Principle” in the Latest U.S. Tax Reform Plan], 7 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 
44, 45 (2017) (国际税收). 
142  See Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Chinese Exceptionalism or New Global Varieties of State 
Capitalism, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 
403, 406-07 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015) (“In China, every time there is a new group of 
Party members in power, journalists and observers in the West speculate about …whether the privatization process 
will be deepened, and how much the state will retreat. Yet, the outcome is always disappointing from the point of 
view of these observers. There is always more state intervention and more state ownership than was expected.”). 
143 See Matthew Miller & Fang Cheng, China Says Framework for State-Owned Enterprise Reform ‘Basically 
Complete,’ REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-soe-reforms/china-says-framework-
for-state-owned-enterprise-reform-basically-complete-idUSKCN1C313P [https://perma.cc/XH4F-PNHS]. 
144 See, e.g., CHEN LI, CHINA’S CENTRALIZED INDUSTRIAL ORDER (2015); REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?, 
supra note 142; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20; Ming Du, China’s State Capitalism and the World Trade Law, 63 
Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 409 (2014); Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 261 (2016); see also BARRY NAUGHTON, The Transformation of the State Sector: SASAC, the Market 
Economy, and the New National Champions, in STATE CAPITALISM, supra note 20, at 46, 47 (arguing Chinese central 
SOEs “have developed into a powerful and profitable economic force, representing the core of state capitalism in 
China.”). 
145  See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., China Country Commercial Guide (2017)  
https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-State-Owned-Enterprises [https://perma.cc/9LVA-36AV]; China’s State 
Enterprises Are Not Retreating but Advancing, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725295-bad-china-and-world-chinas-state-enterprises-are-not-
retreating-advancing [https://perma.cc/Y24N-3SG9]; see also Derek Scissors, China’s SOE Sector Is Bigger Than 
Some Would Have Us Think, E. ASIA F. (May 17, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-
is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/ [https://perma.cc/2RCZ-ERTH] (discussing the difficulty in estimating the 
size of the SOE sector and suggesting SOEs may account for close to 60 percent of GDP.). 
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state’s retreat from the economy.”146 He has reasserted that SOEs should be the commanding 
heights of the economy.147 While Chinese leadership has acknowledged the need to increase the 
competitiveness of SOEs, it has called for making SOEs “bigger and stronger” while maintaining 
them under public ownership.148 Through both improving operations and merging major SOEs 
into even larger corporate giants, the government envisions the transformation of its current 
“national champions” into state-owned “global champions.” 149  As further discussed below, 
China’s recent industrial and foreign policy initiatives are designed to further increase their 
international prominence and global market clout. 150  At the same time, Xi has asserted that 
Communist Party leadership must remain “the root and soul” of SOEs and under his watch the 
Party has strengthened its influence over the business decisions of SOEs, as well as private Chinese 
companies.151 The Party has always maintained extensive legal and political control over major 
SOEs, but recent government pronouncements have placed a particularly strong emphasis on the 
importance of “Party building” and “strengthening Party leadership” within SOEs.152  Moreover, 
                                                 
146 China’s State Enterprises Are Not Retreating but Advancing, supra note 145; see also Reform of China’s 
Ailing State-owned Firms Is Emboldening Them, ECONOMIST (July 22, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21725293-outperformed-private-firms-they-are-no-
longer-shrinking-share-overall [https://perma.cc/Y24N-3SG9] (reporting that Chinese SOEs are now growing faster 
than Chinese private-sector investment). 
147 See Michael Martina & Kevin Yao, As China's Leaders Gather, Market Reform Hopes Fade, REUTERS (Oct. 
17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-reform-analysis/as-chinas-leaders-gather-market-
reform-hopes-fade-idUSKBN1CM142 [https://perma.cc/TU45-VKG7]. 
148  He Wei, China to Create Bigger, Strong State-Owned Firms, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 20, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-10/20/content_33477206.htm [https://perma.cc/48JJ-PFAT]; see Jane 
Cai, Forget Privatisation, Xi Has Other Big Plans for Bloated State Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 6, 2017, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2109943/how-china-making-its-state-firm-dinosaurs-bigger-and-
richer [https://perma.cc/5446-FAKT]; see also Hu Angang (胡鞍钢), Guoyou Qiye: Gonggu, Tisheng he Fazhan 
Guojia Nengli de Zhuli Jun [国有企业 :巩固、提升和发展国家能力的主力军] (State-Owned Enterprises: the Main 
Force for Consolidating, Upgrading and Developing the National Capabilities), 6 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 36 (2016) 
(国际税收) (arguing that SOEs will be the primary force for strengthening China’s national economic power in the 
future). 
149 See Soyoung Kim & Paritosh Bansal, Exclusive: China's State-Owned Firms to Face More Mergers, REUTERS 
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meeting-china-companies-exclusi/exclusive-chinas-state-
owned-firms-to-face-more-mergers-idUSKBN1FD0TM [https://perma.cc/NT3F-E2UR]; Gabriel Wildau, China’s 
State-owned Zombie Economy, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/253d7eb0-ca6c-11e5-84df-
70594b99fc47 [https://perma.cc/P7M5-4LK6]; Huang Kaixi & Song Shiqing, China to Accelerate SOE Consolidation 
in Bid to Build Corporate Giants, CAIXIN (July 19, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-07-19/101118793.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SMD-LLKD]. 
150 See infra Part 4.B; see also Luo Hu, More Needed to Help SOEs Gain World Role, GLOBAL TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1073096.shtml [https://perma.cc/DX25-FFQU] (noting that Chinese SOEs 
are “are supposed to capitalize on the Belt and Road initiative as part of their ambition to become globally 
competitive”). 
151 Emily Feng, Xi Jinping Reminds China’s State Companies of Who’s the Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/world/asia/china-soe-state-owned-enterprises.html [https://perma.cc/5QSV-
TE4E]; see Lucy Hornby, Communist Party Asserts Control over China Inc., FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/29ee1750-a42a-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2 [https://perma.cc/J4RY-UDSN]; see also Tsai 
& Naughton, supra note 20, at 11 (suggesting that maintaining control of SOEs is particularly important to the Party 
as SOEs are seen as a “source of employment and patronage”). 
152 See Communist Party Still at Heart of China’s State Firm Reform Plans: Regulator, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-soe/communist-party-still-at-heart-of-chinas-state-firm-reform-plans-
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the Party is currently engaging in extensive efforts to secretly train and monitor Party cadres in 
overseas branches of SOEs.153 These efforts reflect Xi’s insistence that “east, west, north or south, 
the Party leads everything.”154 Thus, current trends suggest the Party’s extensive systems of legal 
and political control over SOEs described below, are likely to be further strengthened over the 
foreseeable future. 
 The central government primarily exercises its extensive legal and political control over 
major SOEs through two main mechanisms: 1) the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission and 2) the Central Organization Department. The first enables the 
government to exercise broad power associated with roles as both majority owner and regulator. 
The second enables the Party-state to exert domineering influence by controlling the appointment, 
promotion, and removal of all high-level SOE executives.155 As a result, China has succeeded, in 
words of one SOE chairman, in “weav[ing] Party leadership into corporate governance.”156 
Since its creation in 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) has been used by the central government to reassert its control over major 
SOEs.157 In the 1990s, most Chinese SOEs were struggling financially. As a result, the state 
retreated from many labor-intensive and low-value added sectors, selling off nearly half of all 
SOEs between 1997 and 2003.158 Yet at the same time, the government remained committed to 
retaining state ownership of industrial assets in monopolized sectors and those with strategic 
importance—including at the time “armaments, power generation and distribution, oil and 
petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, aviation and shipping.”159 Assets in these sectors—
                                                 
regulator-idUSKBN1DF0A6 [https://perma.cc/UL4C-2UEA]; Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Can China Keep Controlling 
Its SOEs?, DIPLOMAT (March 5, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/can-china-keep-controlling-its-soes/ 
[https://perma.cc/TG4D-2K85]. 
153 See Chinese SOEs Cautiously Carry Out Party Building Activities Overseas, GLOBAL TIMES, Jan. 1, 2018, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1085071.shtml [https://perma.cc/4WKA-W8YX]. 
154 Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Thought – The Communist Party’s Tighter Grip on China in 16 Characters, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Oct. 25, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116836/xi-jinping-
thought-communist-partys-tighter-grip-china [https://perma.cc/C4J2-43RE]; Jeremy Page & Chun Han Wong, Xi 
Jinping Is Alone at the Top and Collective Leadership ‘Is Dead’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2017, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-elevated-to-mao-status-1508825969 [https://perma.cc/7MJG-SXQP]. 
155 See Wang, supra note 84, at 658-660; see also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 711 (“[T]wo parallel 
structures provide for monitoring: one based on the corporate law, with SASAC as controlling shareholder, and a 
second, party-based structure that shadows the corporate hierarchy, especially with respect to high-level managerial 
appointments.”). 
156 Xie Yu, Don’t Panic! Party Leadership is China’s Answer to West’s Corporate Governance Issues, Say SOE 
Bosses, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 8, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/business/investor-
relations/article/2123502/dont-panic-party-leadership-chinas-answer-wests [https://perma.cc/9EB9-56H6]; see also 
Zhou Xin, Communist Party the Top Boss of China’s State Firms, Xi Jinping Asserts in Rare Meeting, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Oct. 12, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2027407/communist-party-top-
boss-chinas-state-firms-xi-jinping-asserts [https://perma.cc/SQA5-A2RK] (quoting Central Party School Professor 
Zhang Xixian’s observation that “the hallmark of state companies with Chinese characteristics is the Party’s 
leadership.”). 
157 See Naughton, supra note 144, at 46. 
158 See id. at 48; Wu, supra note 144, at 270. 
159  Zhao Huanxin, China Names Key Industries for Absolute State Control, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 19, 2006, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/19/content_762056.htm [https://perma.cc/3WUN-M44E];  see Dong 
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supra note 144, at 14. (referring to these industries as “base,” “lifeblood,” “pillar,” or “strategic”). 
 
2018]                                                                                                                                               99 
CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
 
 
often formerly managed by central government ministries or local governments—were 
consolidated into approximately two-hundred vertically integrated state-owned corporate 
groups.160 SASAC was established to serve as the owner of these SOEs for the central government 
and is tasked with their supervision and management.161 Due to their massive scale and direct 
central government ownership, these major SOEs have been described by scholars as “China’s 
national team”162 or “China’s national champions.”163 SASAC has all the powers of a controlling 
shareholder, including approval over all major ownership decisions, the power to consolidate and 
transfer control of corporations, as well as additional regulatory authority.164 Notably, it also has 
“super control rights” over the transfer of SOEs and their subsidiaries that exceed those of 
traditional controlling shareholders under the Chinese Company Law.165 For instance, through 
mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs, it has reduced the number of central SOEs from 196 to 98, 
while increasing total assets under its control.166 SASAC has announced plans for further mergers 
of SOEs in the near future.167 Moreover, in its regulatory authority SASAC has also promulgated 
particularly detailed measures specifying the permissible overseas activities of SOEs.168 
The structure of SASAC enables the Chinese government to control “a majority stake in 
virtually every leading firm in every critical industry in China” while still allowing for some degree 
of market competition and foreign equity in these crucial sectors.169 For a sense of scale, of the 
roughly 100 SOEs administered by SASAC, 48 were ranked in the 2017 Fortune Global 500, 
including State Grid, PetroChina and Sinopec Corp., which were ranked 2, 3 and 4, respectively.170 
It controls China’s top nuclear, aerospace and aviation, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecom, 
electricity, automobile firms as well as its major airlines. 171  Yet, the government allows 
                                                 
160 See LI, supra note 144, at 65; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 711. 
161 See Wang, supra note 84, at 662-664; Zhong, supra note 94; Wendy Leutert, Challenges Ahead-in China’s 
Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, 21 ASIA POLICY 83 (2016). 
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166 See LI, supra note 144, at 75; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 711; China’s Centrally Administered State 
Firms Report Strong Profit Growth, XINHUA (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
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Orchestrated Megamergers, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2017. 
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http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1029539.shtml [https://perma.cc/9KAL-MCAW]. 
169 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20 at, 735; see also Wu, supra note 144, at 271 (“SASAC is undoubtedly one of 
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170 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Comm’n of the State Council (SASAC), 2017 “Caifu” 
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公布 国务院国资委监管 48家央企上榜] (2017 Fortune Global 500 Announced--48 SASAC Supervised SOEs on 
the List) (July 20, 2017), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588119/c7419470/content.html 
[https://perma.cc/2RNM-NH6F]; Globe 500, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/global500/2017/ [https://perma.cc/B5D5-
JUWY]. 
171 See LI, supra note 144, at 159.  
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competition in many of these sectors, by having multiple SOEs fight for market shares amongst 
themselves.172 For instance, SASAC has allowed for cutthroat competition between three major 
state-owned airlines over pricing and domestic routes, but has vetoed past proposed mergers 
between the three.173 The structure of SASAC and SOE groups has also enabled the government 
to raise significant funds through listing minority stakes of SOE subsidiaries on public stock 
markets.174 SASAC remains the 100 percent shareholder of the core holding company (or parent 
corporation) of most SOE groups. This core holding company retains a majority share in one or 
more publicly traded subsidiaries. 175  By offering these minority stakes internationally, the 
government has been able to raise fresh capital for Chinese SOEs without relinquishing 
government control.176 Recently, the government has also begun experimenting with offering 
minority stakes in SOE subsidiaries to private equity funds under the banner of “mixed-
ownership.”177 Yet, private investors admit that even in SOEs with the highest levels of private 
investment, SASAC and the Communist Party’s personnel bureau remain “the real power behind 
SOE decision-making.”178 
Although not part of SASAC, the largest Chinese financial institutions also remain under 
state ownership and control through a broadly similar mechanism. During the early 1990s, as SOEs 
were undergoing corporatization, China’s wholly-owned and central controlled financial 
                                                 
172 See Wu, supra note 144, at 271 (“SASAC controls China’s three major telecommunications companies, its 
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2007), http://english.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-15/100033624.html [https://perma.cc/GH6Z-3C59].  
174 See LI, supra note 144, at 65; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 711. 
175 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 700; see also Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 23, at 673 (reporting that 
“almost all of the thirty-four subsidiaries of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)” have some degree 
of private investment). 
176 See LI, supra note 144, at 138; Monique Taylor, China’s Oil Industry: ‘Corporate Governance with Chinese 
Characteristics,’ in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN CHINA AND INDIA 79 (Ed. Xu Yi-
chong, 2012); see also Yang Ge, 5 Things to Know About China’s Mixed-Ownership Reform, CAIXIN (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-08-28/101136807.html [https://perma.cc/E466-76ER] (“Most big state-owned 
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50% or more of the company’s shares. Under that arrangement, the central government sees anyone who buys shares 
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https://www.ft.com/content/0dd0b152-8659-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 [https://perma.cc/K7LZ-CC24]. 
 
2018]                                                                                                                                               101 
CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
 
 
institutions were significantly reformed.179 The resulting banks were categorized as either policy 
banks or commercial banks.180 Policy banks remain wholly-owned and directly controlled, with 
each dedicated to specific lending purposes and policy goals.181 In contrast, the major commercial 
banks more closely resemble SOEs—nominally operating under commercial considerations but 
remaining under extensive government control.182 Following a series of reforms during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the Central Huajin—a holding company established under China’s main 
sovereign wealth fund (the China Investment Corporation) retains a controlling interest in the four 
largest commercial banks, and in combination with other state-controlled holdings gives the 
government majority control in each.183 While minority shares are listed on stock exchanges and 
held by foreign investors, in reality, the state “has not ceded any substantial aspects of its control 
over these banks.”184 Moreover, the Party’s Central Organization Department controls leadership 
appointments to each of the ten largest commercial finance institutions.185 
The Communist Party maintains control over key SOEs through its authority over the 
appointment of senior executives. The powerful Central Organization Department of the 
Communist Party appointments nearly all state officials throughout China and regularly evaluates 
high-level appointees based on performance metrics.186 The top 53 major SOEs are ranked at the 
vice-ministerial level or above, meaning their top executives have the same rank as Vice Provincial 
Governors or Party Secretaries.187 The Central Organization Department is thus charged with 
appointing and evaluating the Board Chairmen, CEOs, and Party Secretaries of these SOEs. 
SASAC is responsible for the appointment and evaluation of deputies in these firms and the top 
executives in all other centrally-controlled SOEs.188 In practice, personnel decisions are always 
jointly announced by SASAC and the Central Organization Department.189 That is to say, Party 
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189 See Li-Wen Lin, Reforming China’s State-owned Enterprises: From Structure to People, 229 CHINA Q. 107, 
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organs control the appointment of all high-level SOE personnel whether or not the SOE has a board 
of directors in place.190 These appointees often serve concurrent roles on both the core holding 
company and on listed subsidiaries.191 Appointees are virtually all long-time Communist Party 
members with strong history of political loyalty to the Party.192 They have been trained in the Party 
school system for midcareer cadres and often take specialized training courses at the Central Party 
School in Beijing to study Communist Party ideology.193 Even in publicly listed SOE subsidiaries, 
virtually no state-appointed CEOs had worked “outside the state system.”194 
The extent of the Party’s power over executive positions at central SOEs expands beyond 
initial appointments, as illustrated by its tradition of dramatic rotations of high-level appointees 
between enterprises. For instance in 2003 the Party rotated the CEOs of China’s top three 
telecommunications companies—all publicly listed in Hong Kong of New York—without prior 
notice or board consultation.195 Similarly, in 2009 it rotated the CEOs of three largest state airlines, 
and in 2011 rotated the CEOs of the three central petroleum enterprises.196 By one estimate, since 
2003 there have been at least 30 cases of “intra-sector” rotations of high level appointees between 
different SOEs in the same industry.197 These rotations enable the Party to “reduce concentration 
of authority in a single individual in firms.”198 In general, senior officials are shuffled into new 
positions every few years and successful executives are increasingly promoted to higher-level 
positions in Party leadership after their stint at major SOEs.199  
Party Committees within SOEs groups give the Party an additional system of oversight 
over the decisions of top executives. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping these Committees, 
composed of ranking Communist Party members within each enterprise, have been strengthened 
and granted a greater role in monitoring business decisions within SOEs.200 For instance, the 
bylaws of many SOE subsidiaries now require major business to first be discussed by the 
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company’s Party Committee before managers are allowed to take action.201 These Committees 
thus represent another mechanism for “supervising the implementation of [Communist Party] and 
national policies within the company.”202  
Thanks to Party’s oversight mechanisms and its influence over appointees’ career 
trajectories, SOE executives generally have strong incentives to obey Party directives. Both 
anecdotal and quantitative evidence suggest political allegiance, rather than profits or economic 
efficiency, appears to be the paramount quality in evaluating managers of China’s SOEs.203 In the 
words of one scholar, when conflicts arise between economic and political objectives, SOEs “often 
have to give priority to the political objective[s].”204 Or as another has put it, “the goals of the state 
are dominant in SOE executives’ decision-making processes.”205 SOE managers are willing to 
sacrifice economic performance in the name of achieving other goals set by the Party.206 It is this 
partial subordination of profits to political concerns that raises a distinctive set of issues with regard 
to China’s international tax policy.207 
B. SOEs in China’s “Going Out” and “Belt and Road” Initiatives  
Another defining feature of Chinese state capitalism is the role of government industrial 
policy in shaping the Chinese economy. While China’s five-year plans no longer include strict 
production quotas for all commodities, as they once did under the command economy of Mao 
Zedong, they continue to lay out the government’s policy priorities and its overarching economic 
goals.208 The Chinese government allows the market to play an important role in the economy but 
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corporate affairs.”) 
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still believes the overall direction of economic development must be determined by government 
policy and not market forces. Through its industrial policy, the Chinese government “aims to go 
beyond just riding the waves of markets by actively creating the waves on which to ride.”209 
China’s chief economic planning authority, the National Development and Reform Commission, 
has a variety of tools at its disposal to implement its plan across the economy, such as authority 
over the allocation of stimulus funding and over the pricing of commodities not set by the 
market.210 But more importantly, since the Commission’s five-year plans represent a distillation 
of the Communist Party’s long-term priorities, all major economic actors in the country—
including central SOEs—modify their strategies and rhetoric to bring them in line with the plans.211 
Quantitative evidence suggests that China’s five-year plans have significant impacts on the 
performance of SOEs in prioritized sectors, with SOEs in supported industries enjoying faster 
growth and access to additional financing.212 The most recent plans have prioritized high-tech and 
emerging industries including green energy and nuclear power, biotechnology, advanced 
manufacturing, and new materials.213 
Since the early 2000s, China’s industrial policy has prioritized outbound investment by 
SOEs in furtherance of both economic and foreign policy goals. While some SOEs had been 
engaging in overseas activities in the 1990s with government indifference,214 at the dawn of the 
new millennium the Chinese government officially launched its “going out” (or “go global”) policy 
to actively encourage enterprises to pursue overseas investments. 215  Under this slogan the 
government supported investments by large SOEs, in particular in acquisitions of upstream 
commodity assets needed to support China’s rapid economic growth.216 The central government 
decrees identified recommended sectors and nations for foreign investment and the state-directed 
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policy banks provided subsidized financing for such investments.217 For instance, under this policy 
generous loans were given to state-owned oil companies to acquire stakes in foreign oil and gas 
production to better secure China’s access to energy resources. 218  Similar support was also 
extended to SOEs to secure foreign mineral resources.219 Over the decade, state officials would 
broaden the policy beyond natural resources and extend support to foreign projects in the 
transportation, telecommunications, and nuclear energy sectors.220 As a result of these policies, 
from 2005 to 2013, SOEs were responsible for upwards of 90 percent of Chinese outbound direct 
investments.221  
The 2013 announcement of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative sparked additional 
overseas investment by SOEs.222 The initiative has been described as an “‘upgraded’ version of 
China’s ‘Go Global’ strategy” as it seems designed, in part, to further expand the global footprint 
of China’s SOEs.223  Since SOEs dominate infrastructure-related industries within China, the 
initiative’s focus on boosting transportation and energy infrastructure across Eurasia places SOEs 
at its center.224 Within its first two years, the initiative had already produced new lucrative business 
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Problem With China’s One Belt, One Road Strategy, DIPLOMAT (May 24, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/the-problem-with-chinas-one-belt-one-road-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/Z78N-
7KT8](noting that projects associated with the Initiative “are often tied to political pacts through which China’s state-
owned enterprises get exclusive bidding rights”). 
223  Yu Jie, China’s One Belt, One Road: A Reality Check, LSE IDEAS, MEDIUM (July 24, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@lseideas/chinas-one-belt-one-road-a-reality-check-b28030ac6d3b [https://perma.cc/D8YU-
Y7ZA]. 
224  GISELA GRIEGER, ONE BELT, ONE ROAD (OBOR): CHINA'S REGIONAL INTEGRATION INITIATIVE, EUR. 
PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. 6, PE 586.608 (July 2016) (“Large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which dominate the 
Chinese infrastructure-related sectors, are expected to have a major stake in OBOR's first implementation stage ….”); 
see also Julan Du & Yifei Zhang, Does One Belt One Road Initiative Promote Chinese Overseas Direct Investment?, 
47 CHINA ECON. REV. 189 (2018) (discussing the role of SOEs in One Belt, One Road initiative related overseas direct 
investment). 
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opportunities for the ten or so central SOEs focused on civil-engineering and construction.225 And 
by 2017, at least 40 Chinese SOEs had multiple projects in countries associated with the 
initiative.226 At the end of 2014, SASAC published a report highlighting the impact of the initiative 
on the overseas operations of central SOEs. At that time, nearly all central SOEs were active 
overseas. Overseas operations constituted 12.7% of central SOE’s total assets, 18.3% of their 
operational revenues, and 8.6% of their total profits.227 Since the start of the initiative, central 
SOEs have on average increased their overseas assets 15% annually and their overseas revenue by 
4% annually.228  One recent study suggests that thus far, nearly 70% of investment and over 95% 
of construction under the initiative have come from SOEs. 229  Moreover, government 
pronouncements suggest central SOEs will continue to be the “major force” behind the next phase 
of the initiative.230  
As a result of these government policies, SOEs continue to account for an outsized 
percentage of Chinese outbound investment. Recent estimates suggest central SOEs continue to 
account for between 60% and 70% of China’s outbound direct investments on a yearly basis.231 
Moreover, Chinese cumulative capital stock held overseas “remains dominated” by SOEs.232 
Chinese government statistics indicate that SOEs hold more than half (54.3%) of China’s 
cumulative non-financial foreign investment and total overseas assets in excess of US $900 
billion. 233  Some scholars have suggested even these official statistics understate the total 
                                                 
225  See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “One Belt, One Road” Enhances Xi Jinping’s Control Over the Economy, 
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (May 15, 2015), https://jamestown.org/program/one-belt-one-road-enhances-xi-jinpings-
control-over-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/2T6L-FCPG]. 
226  BAKER MCKENZIE, BELT & ROAD: OPPORTUNITY & RISK 13 (2017), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en.  
227  See The Roadmap of SOE's Presence in “Belt and Road,” PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, July 16, 2015, 
http://en.people.cn/business/n/2015/0716/c90778-8921479.html [https://perma.cc/M4AM-TTU9]. 
228 State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the State Council (SASAC), Zhongyang Qiye Canyu 
“Yidai Yilu” Gong Jian Qingkuang [中央企业参与“一带一路”共建情况] (Central Enterprises Participation in 
Building the “Belt and Road) (2017), 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n4470048/n4470081/n4582104/c4594908/content.html [https://perma.cc/9KAJ-F862]. 
229 CECLIA JOY-PÉREZ & DEREK SCISSORS, AM. ENTER. INST., THE CHINESE STATE FUNDS BELT AND ROAD BUT 
DOES NOT HAVE TRILLIONS TO SPARE, at 12 (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/BRI.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHR5-WCCB]. 
230  Zhong Nan, SOEs to Take Lead Role Along Belt and Road, CHINA DAILY, May 9, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-05/09/content_29258516.html [perma.cc/76TK-PBNJ]. 
[https://perma.cc/76TK-PBNJ]. 
231 See Central Enterprises Participation in Building the “Belt and Road,” supra note 228; Wendy Wu, How the 
Communist Party Controls China’s State-Owned Industrial Titans, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 17, 2017, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2098755/how-communist-party-controls-chinas-state-owned-
industrial-titans [perma.cc/9B54-3MWG]; SOE Overseas Assets Surge, XINHUA (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/19/c_134341330.htm. [https://perma.cc/X6ZW-B66S]. 
232 Scissors, supra note 145. 
233 See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Zhongguo Duiwai Touzi Hezuo Fazhan 
Baogao [中国对外投资合作发展报告] (Report on Development of China’s Outward Investment and Economic 
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percentage outbound foreign direct investment held by SOEs.234   
Outbound direct investment by Chinese SOEs is not limited to developing countries as 
SOEs and their subsidiaries still dominate Chinese direct investment in the United States in terms 
of value.235 In sum, central SOEs play a commanding role in Chinese outbound international 
investment, making them particularly relevant to the future of Chinese international tax policy. 
C. Capital Controls and Outbound Investment Regulations 
A dramatic rise and fall in the outbound investment by Chinese private enterprises and 
individuals in 2016 further illustrates the central government’s ability to use capital controls—
another element of Chinese state capitalism—to influence the character and volume of Chinese 
overseas investment. In 2016, the Chinese yuan (also known as the renminbi) declined sharply 
against the dollar, leading many Chinese individuals and businesses to seek protection from 
depreciation by purchasing foreign currency or assets.236 That year, China witnessed a boom in 
outbound acquisitions, largely driven by private companies such as Anbang Insurance, Dalian 
Wanda, Fosun and HNA.237 For the first time, outbound investment by privately-owned Chinese 
enterprises surpassed that of SOEs.238 China’s outbound M&A volume broke existing annual 
records in just the first six months of the year and ended up surpassing U.S. outbound M&A 
volume for the first time.239 Yet Chinese government officials soon suspected that many of these 
private corporations were overpaying for speculative foreign assets as a way of shifting assets 
outside of China.240  
In response, starting in November 2016, the government tightened capital controls and 
regulations on outbound investment. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), is a 
                                                 
234 See Scissors, supra note 145; see also Du, supra note 205, at 1128 (suggesting a lower bound of approximately 
70% on the percentage of Chinese total outbound foreign direct investment held by SOEs). 
235 See Ji Li, I Came, I Saw, I... Adapted: An Empirical Study of Chinese Business Expansion in the United States 
and its Legal and Policy Implications, 36 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 143, 165 (2016). 
236 See Saumya Vaishampayan & Lingling Wei, Yuan Weakness Spurs Fresh Surge in China Outflows, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 7, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/yuan-weakness-spurs-fresh-surge-in-china-outflows-1478520675. 
237 See Sui-Lee Wee, China Steps up Warnings over Debt-fueled Overseas Acquisitions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/business/dealbook/china-companies-deals-debt.html; Xie Yu, China’s 
Probes on Fosun, HNA and Others Unleash the Power of the Unsaid Word, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 8, 2017, 
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power-unsaid [perma.cc/H83R-74FW]. 
238 See Don Weinland, Emily Feng & Sherry Fei Ju, State-led Companies Back on Top in China’s Outbound M&A 
Rankings, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/18b1352c-8e26-11e7-a352-e46f43c5825d. 
239 See Denny Thomas, China Outbound M&A Beats 2015 Record with 6 Months to Spare, REUTERS (June 20, 
2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-m-a/china-outbound-ma-beats-2015-record-with-6-months-to-
spare-idUSKCN0Z60UI [perma.cc/6BEJ-JASK]; Xie Yu, Record Year for China’s Outbound M&A as It Overtakes 
US for the First Time, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 21, 2016, 
http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2056099/record-year-chinas-outbound-ma-it-overtakes-us-first-
time [perma.cc/LG8C-98UQ]. 
240 See, e.g., Heiwei Tang & Christopher Beddor, It’s No Accident that China’s Tycoons Are Bad Investors, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 17, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/17/its-no-accident-that-chinas-tycoons-are-bad-
investors [perma.cc/JM9L-DCAS]; Angelo Katsoras, The Story Behind China’s Crackdown on Outbound Investments, 
NAT’L BANK CAN. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.nbc.ca/content/dam/bnc/en/rates-and-analysis/economic-
analysis/GeopoliticalBriefing_4oct2017.pdf [perma.cc/5JB9-YF5K].  
 
108                                                                                                                                         [Vol.10:1 
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW 
central government institution that controls whether Chinese companies, both domestic and 
foreign-invested, may convert renminbi into foreign currency and whether they may transfer such 
funds overseas.241 While it previously vetted only corporate cross-border money transfers of more 
than US $50 million, SAFE reportedly started requiring pre-approval for all overseas transfers of 
more than US $5 million.242 Government regulators also stepped-up administrative scrutiny of 
outbound investments with the goal of weeding out those that it deemed “irrational.”243 As a result, 
outbound investment declined more than 40% in the first seven months of 2017.244 In August 2017, 
China’s top economic planning body announced a new system of regulation for overseas 
investments. Restrictions were placed on investments in property, hotels, film, entertainment, and 
sports. On the other hand, investments related to the Belt and Road initiative, infrastructure, energy, 
and high-tech businesses would be given preferential state support.245 Regulations were also put 
in place requiring SOEs to prove the financial viability of overseas projects before undertaking 
investments and mandating stricter auditing procedures, particularly for currency transactions.246 
To observers, the new regulations reaffirm the government’s preference for overseas investments 
to be led primarily by SOEs rather than private corporations.247  
                                                 
241 See Gary Lock & Karen Ip, Getting Your Cash Back, 28 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 36 (2009); Friedrich Wu, Robbert-
Jan Korthah & Ng Kuan Khai, How Safe Is SAFE's Management of China's Official Foreign Exchange Reserves?, 14 
WORLD ECON. 19, 20–21 (2013).  
242 See James T. Areddy & Lingling Wei, Foreign Companies Face New Clampdown for Getting Money out of 
China, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-companies-face-new-clampdown-for-
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at 55–56 (describing the gradual liberalization of SAFE exchange regulations from 2008 to 2015).  
243  See ANDREW MCGINTY, JUN WEI & LIANG XU, HOGAN LOVELLS, CHINA’S NEW FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
CONTROLS CREATE FRESH CONCERNS (Jan. 2017), at 2-3, https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-
lovells/pdf/chinas-new-foreign-exchange-controls-create-fresh-concerns-for-foreign-investors.pdf [perma.cc/JQ3N-
XWGD]. 
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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-18/china-further-limits-overseas-investment-in-push-to-reduce-
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INVESTMENTS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-China-Issues-Formal-Guidance-for-
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246 Guoyou Qiye Jingwai Touzi Caiwu Guanli Banfa [国有企业境外投资财务管理办法] (Measures for the 
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The Chinese government’s aggressive enforcement of capital controls in 2016 targeted 
“irrational” outbound direct investment, reflecting the fact that Chinese capital control regime has 
long been more accommodating to direct investment than portfolio investment. Cross-border 
investment is generally classified as foreign direct investment when the investor owns at least 10% 
of the stock of a foreign entity—as equity ownership above this level presumably reflects 
significant influence in corporate decision making. In contrast, investment below this 10% level 
or in debt securities is considered passive or portfolio investment.248 Since 1991, an approval and 
registration process has been in place for Chinese enterprises to make direct investments in foreign 
projects.249 Even after a series of significant reforms in the early 2000s, this approval process can 
still be arduous, requiring certifications from multiple government departments. 250  Yet the 
regulation of outbound direct investment remains more permissive than that of outbound portfolio 
investment. Until the mid 2000s, Chinese capital controls prohibited individuals and companies 
from making portfolio investments in overseas stock markets or securities.251 Starting in 2006, 
under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) regime, a limited number of Chinese 
financial institutions were granted licenses to invest in overseas securities. Approved institutions 
are each granted a specific quota set by SAFE and the regime heavily restricts what foreign 
securities are eligible for investment. 252  These institutions may then repackage these foreign 
investments into financial products offered to domestic investors.253 While the government is 
considering pilot programs to allow additional offshore portfolio investments, further 
liberalization has been repeatedly delayed.254 As a result of these policies, Chinese foreign outward 
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Chinese investors). 
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portfolio investment remains minuscule both in comparison to its outbound direct investments and 
to that of other countries.255 
 The same pattern holds for inbound investments, with Chinese capital controls far more 
permissive towards direct investment than portfolio investment by foreign investors. As previously 
noted, China has sought to attract inward foreign direct investment since the start of reform and 
opening up policy.256 While certain sectors remain off-limits to foreign investors—a point of 
considerable tension in U.S.-China trade relations257—there are no capital controls on inward 
foreign direct investment. 258  In contrast, China continues to strictly limit inbound portfolio 
investment.259 Starting in 2002, under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) regime, 
a limited number of qualified foreign institutional investors were first permitted to invest in the 
Chinese stock market, Chinese bonds, Chinese ETFs, and other securities. Potential QFII investors 
must apply for an investment quota from Chinese regulators and face minimum holding or lockup 
periods before being permitted to repatriate capital gains.260 China has increased the QFII regime’s 
quota limitations and reduced its lock-up periods three times since its original roll-out.261 In 2014 
and 2016 China further liberalized foreign portfolio investment with the opening of the Hong 
Kong-Shanghai and Hong Kong-Shenzhen Stock Connect systems, which each allow for US $3.4 
billion to flow between Hong Kong and each Mainland stock market.262 These systems allow 
foreign investors to trade a subset of Chinese stocks without a quota or lockup period and gives 
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[perma.cc/7RDU-7BR8] (discussing the 2009 adjustments to QFII quotas and lockup periods). 
261  See China Relaxes QFII Control, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Feb. 22, 2016), 
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mainland investors access to the Hong Kong stock market.263 Yet, commentators have noted that 
while this reform is significant, China remains “far from being a free, open stock market that 
investors from outside the country can access in its entirety.”264 Unsurprisingly, China’s inward 
portfolio investment stock is also miniscule in comparison to inward direct investment and to 
inward portfolio investment in other countries.265 
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR DISTINCTIVE CHINESE INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICIES 
AND NORMS 
A. Continued Income Taxation of Chinese SOEs 
As the previous Part has illustrated, the Chinese central government maintains extensive 
control over the shape of the Chinese economy, through its system of SOEs, industrial planning 
initiatives, and capital controls. Looking forward, China’s international tax policy is likely to be 
strongly influenced by this unique system of state capitalism. This Part advances three ways in 
which the role of SOEs and capital controls may lead to distinctive sets of Chinese tax policies and 
preferences. First, China’s system of state capitalism may allow it to maintain a functional system 
of worldwide corporate taxation despite a general international trend toward more territorial 
systems. Second, Chinese tax officials may help SOEs engage in foreign tax planning. Finally, 
Chinese tax law is likely to continue to provide differential treatment to SOEs and private 
enterprises engaging in investment abroad and Chinese tax diplomacy may seek to ensure other 
countries offer favorable tax treatment to Chinese SOEs.  
 As a threshold matter, enterprise income taxation will likely remain the primary concern 
of China’s international tax policy. Admittedly, the future of corporate income taxation as a 
significant source of government revenue remains a topic of debate amongst Western scholars.266 
And in recent years, notable U.S. pundits on both sides of the political spectrum have called for its 
abolition, suggesting offsetting increases in individual income tax or other integration schemes.267 
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ould_just_get_rid_of.html [https://perma.cc/WP8X-L6ZU]; Kevin D. Williamson, End the Corporate Tax, NAT’L 
REV. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/corporate-tax-rate-reduction-zero-percent-would-be-
better-15/ [https://perma.cc/27GX-QGFX]. 
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Yet, in China, and other developing countries, relatively weak individual income tax systems 
coupled with an outsized role for corporate income taxes in government revenue makes the 
elimination of corporate income taxation appear untenable.268 In OECD members states, corporate 
income taxes on average represent 8.9 percent of total tax revenue, while individual income taxes 
represent 24.4 percent of total tax revenue.269 In fact, in all but two of the 35 OECD member states 
revenue from individual income taxes exceed that from corporate income taxes.270 Yet in China 
this pattern is reversed. In 2016 the enterprise income tax accounted for 22.13 percent of total tax 
revenue in China, while the individual income tax accounted for only 7.74 percent.271 Moreover, 
the relative contribution of enterprise income tax revenue has increased significantly across the 
new millennium. More generally, China’s total tax revenue collected as a percentage of GDP 
remains relatively low compared to both OECD and other BRIC countries and it will likely need 
to raise additional revenue to strengthen its social welfare programs.272 As a result, the elimination 
of the corporate income tax is highly unlikely, especially in light of China’s relatively 
underdeveloped individual income tax system.273 
Similarly, income taxation of SOEs is likely to remain an important source of tax revenue. 
While the percentage of loss-making Chinese SOEs increased across the 1990s, to nearly 50 
percent in 1998, following the establishment of SASAC in 2003, central SOEs saw their operations 
stabilize and profits soar.274 The profits of central SOEs quadrupled from 2002 to 2007, jumping 
                                                 
268 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals, in GLOBAL 
TAX FAIRNESS, supra note 64, at 114. 
269 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD (2017), REVENUE STATISTICS 2017: TAX REVENUE TRENDS IN 
THE OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-highlights-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TBU-
FXT4]. 
270 Slovakia and Chile are the exceptions to this rule. See id.  
271 See Bai Yanfeng & Cui Rui [白彦锋 & 崔芮], Guoji Shuishou Jingzheng yu Woguo Qiye Suodeshu Gaige de 
Lixing Xuanze [国际税收竞争与我国企业所得税改革的理性选择] (International Tax Competition and Rational 
Choices for Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Reform), 5 SUB NAT’L FISCAL RES. 31 (2017) [地方财政研究]; see also 
STATE ADMIN. OF TAX’N, REVENUE STATISTICS, , http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367736/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/JQA3-GSJY] (reporting in 2015 the corporate income tax similarly represented 21 percent of total 
tax revenues). 
272 See Jeffery Owens [杰弗里·欧文斯], Shuishou Zai Shixian “Zhongguo Meng” Zhong de Zuoyong [税收在
实现“中国梦”中的作用] (The Role of Taxation in Realizing the “Chinese Dream”), 12 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 34 
(2017) [国际税收]; see also Mingxing Cao [曹明星], BEPS Fanglue: Xin Weiquan Zhuyi Chong Gou Guoji Shuishou 
Zhixu de Jijie Hao? [BEPS方略:新威权主义重构国际税收秩序的集结号?] (BEPS Strategy: Is It an Assembly 
Signal for New Authoritarianism to Reconstruct International Tax Order? ), 7 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 16, 20 (2014) 
[国际税收] (noting China’s relatively low tax revenue and arguing that as China’s economy continues to grow, both 
the government’s spending on the social security and its tax revenues will be required to continue to grow); Revenue 
Statistics 2017, supra note at 269, at 3 (noting the OECD average of tax revenue as percentage of GDP was 34.3 
percent. In China it was 21.6 percent). 
273 See Dou Benbin, How China’s Income Tax Became a Levy on the Poor, SIXTH TONE (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1969/how-chinas-income-tax-became-a-levy-on-the-poor [https://perma.cc/5WGH-
J5Y3]; Maggie Zhang, China ‘Not Ready’ for US-style Whole Family Income Tax, Although Progressive Changes 
Are Underway, S. CHINA MORNING POST, March 20, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/business/global-
economy/article/2137876/china-not-ready-us-style-whole-family-income-tax-although [https://perma.cc/KRX6-
GEFG]. 
274 See Wang, supra note 84, at 647; Tsai & Naughton, supra note 20, at 2. 
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from approximately 2 percent of GDP to 3.8 percent of GDP.275 More generally, profits of all 
SOEs (including state financial firms and local SOEs), increased from approximately 263 billion 
yuan (US $41.6 billion) in 2002 to 1.089 trillion yuan (US $170.9 billion) in 2007, an annual 
increase of 32.6 percent.276 In 2017 total SOE profits stood at 2.9 trillion yuan (US $453.2 billion), 
with central SOE profits reaching records levels of 1.4 trillion yuan (US $217.5 billion).277 Along 
with this increase in profitability, taxes on SOEs have become a significant source of government 
revenue. SOEs now contribute more than 10 percent of total enterprise income tax revenue and 
central SOEs are routinely listed as China’s largest taxpayers. 278 
Moreover, income taxation is likely to remain the primary mechanism for transferring 
earnings from SOEs to the central government. As noted by Wei Cui, taxation of SOEs is a 
widespread but severely undertheorized and studied phenomena.279 Even fundamental conceptual 
questions—why do countries tax the income of their SOEs and are such taxes rational—remain 
unsettled.280 Scholars have recognized that for wholly government-owned SOEs (where all profit 
nominally belongs to the state), the government could access SOE profits by means of either a 
profits tax or a dividend distribution. 281 Yet, like China today, most advanced economies prior to 
the wave of SOE privatizations in the 1980s maintained an income tax on SOEs.282 The Soviet 
Union, which is perhaps the closest, but still inexact, analogue to Chinese state capitalism, also 
imposed an income tax on state-owned corporations which provided the bulk of central 
government tax revenue.283 In his early seminal article on SOE taxation, Robert Floyd argued that 
imposing the same income tax on SOEs as private enterprises can be justified in mixed-economies 
                                                 
275 Naughton notes that “for comparison, ExxonMobil’s record profit in 2007 was equal to 0.2% of U.S. GDP.” 
Naughton, supra note 144, at 51. 
276 See Jia Kang & Liu Wei (贾康 & 刘微), Tigao Guomin Shouru Fenpei “Liang Ge Bizhong” Ezhi Shouru 
Chaju Kuoda de Caishui Sikao yu Jianyi (提高国民收入分配 “两个比重” 遏制收入差距扩大的财税思考与建议) 
[Thoughts and Suggestions to Improve the National Income Distribution’s “Two Weights” and Contain the Expanding 
Income Gap], 12 FISCAL RES. 2, 12 (2010) [财政研究]. 
277  Chinese SOEs See Solid Profit Growth in 2017, XINHUA (Jan. 23, 2018), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/23/c_136918113.htm [https://perma.cc/GG5B-RRV8]; Chinese State 
Enterprises Post Record Level of Profits in 2017, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2128446/chinese-state-enterprises-post-record-level-profits-2017 
[https://perma.cc/VX8M-5GR4]. 
278 See Cui, Taxation of State-Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China, in REGULATING 
THE VISIBLE HAND?, supra note 142, at 109, 118; Wang, supra note 84, at 647, 666. 
279 Cui, supra note 278, at 110. 
280 See id. at 111-112. 
281 See, e.g., id. at 111; Robert H. Floyd, Some Aspects of Income Taxation of Public Enterprises, 25 INT’L 
MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 310, 312 (June 1978). 
282 See Floyd, supra note 281, at 313; Glenn P. Jenkins, Taxation and State-owned Enterprises 1 (Development 
Discussion Paper No. 225, Apr. 1986), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.577.9665&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/2PQG-
2MD2]; Wei Cui, supra note 278, at 110; see generally Carles Boix, Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the 
Eighties: Economic Performance, Partisan Responses and Divided Governments, 27 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 473 (1997) 
(examining the evolution of state-owned enterprises in OECD countries during the 1980s).   
283 See Sergei V. Aleksashenko, Establishment of a Taxation System in the USSR, 3 COMMUNIST ECON. & ECON. 
TRANSFORMATION 81 (1991); Vernon G. Setser, The Immunities of the State and Government Economic Activities, 24 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 298 (1959). 
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where SOEs have a profit motive, as such a tax is required “to prevent tax-induced distortions in 
the allocation of resources.”284 If SOEs are responsive to rates of return and are able to shift 
investments, failure to impose an income tax on SOEs could result in inefficiently high levels of 
SOE investment thanks to their tax-advantaged status.285 However, this explanation has been 
criticized by subsequent scholarship, as imposing seemingly identical tax rules on SOEs and 
private enterprises will still fail to place identical tax burdens on SOEs, since SOEs have greater 
access to financing (and thus interest deductions) and subsidies not as readily available to private 
enterprises.286 Moreover, other alternative mechanisms exist for better ensuring that the rate of 
return on SOE investments meets that of the private sector.287 This critique is particularly relevant 
in the context of China, where central SOEs are widely acknowledged to have easier access to 
credit and subsidies than private firms, thus “creating an unequal playing field for SOEs, private 
companies and foreign firms.”288 For these reason, Wei Cui argues that the best justification for 
corporate income taxation on Chinese SOE is as a type of forced distribution of SOE earnings, 
designed to avoid the corporate governance challenges associated with ensuring proper levels of 
SOE dividend payments.289 
Another rationale for imposing income tax on SOEs concerns situations of mixed-
ownership. Income taxation in comparison to pro rata dividends transfers a greater portion of SOE 
earnings to the state rather than private investors.290 Since the state receives 100 percent of income 
tax payments, but less than 100 percent of dividend payments, from the perspective of central 
government policy-makers wishing to maximize the total amount of revenue transferred to the 
state from a mixed-ownership SOE, higher corporate income tax payments are preferable to larger 
dividend payments. As an example, take a hypothetical central SOE, ChinaCo, 70 percent owned 
by SASAC and 30 percent owned by qualified foreign institutional investors.291 ChinaCo earns 
                                                 
284 Floyd, supra note 281, at 341. 
285 See id. at 340  
286 See Jenkins, supra note 282, at 2-3; see also Cui, supra note 22, at 794 (discussing and adding to these 
criticisms). 
287 See id. at 3. 
288 Jane Cai, Private Players Feeling Squeezed out by Beijing’s Support for State Companies, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Oct. 4, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2113869/past-its-use-date-warps-chinas-
antiquated-policy-picking-industry [https://perma.cc/39EG-8N96]; see State of Grace, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21710291-government-their-side-chinas-state-firms-
borrow-cheaply-state-grace [https://perma.cc/T8RA-NPKM]; Gabriel Wildau, supra note 149 (“SOEs also enjoy non-
cash benefits like low-interest bank loans and discounts on land, water and electricity.”); see also; Kai Li, Heng Yue 
& Longkai Zhao, Ownership, Institutions, and Capital Structure: Evidence from China, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 471 (2009) 
(showing that state ownership is positively associated with leverage and firms’ access to long-term debt, while foreign 
ownership is negatively associated with all measures of leverage). 
289 See Cui, supra note 278, at 112, 130; Cui, supra note 22, at 781. 
290 Since the primary question motivating Wei Cui’s theory “is how a purely state-owned firm would respond to 
taxation,” he briefly acknowledges that mixed-ownership may provide a partial explanation for SOE taxation, but he 
otherwise devotes little attention to tax policy implication of mixed-ownership. See Cui, supra note 278, at 112; Cui, 
supra note 22, at 787. Yet, the Chinese government’s continuing support for mixed-ownership reforms of central 
SOEs would suggest such ownership structures are highly relevant to tax policy considerations—even if less relevant 
for theory. 
291 SASAC has recently made public pronouncements explicitly inviting foreign investors to participate in mixed-
ownership reforms. See Jing Shuiyu, Ownership Reform Welcomes All Comers, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 29, 2017 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-09/29/content_32626118.htm [https://perma.cc/848H-VTVJ]. 
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$100 in China before tax. On any pro rata dividend payment, the foreign investors would be subject 
to a 10 percent withholding tax on the dividends received.292 As shown in Table 1 below, under 
either the standard enterprise tax rate of 25 percent or High and New Technology Enterprise rate 
of 15 percent, more revenue goes to the state than if SOE profits were untaxed. This same basic 
pattern holds no matter the size of the minority stake or whether it is held by foreign or Chinese 
investors. Thus, in the mixed-ownership context, income taxation of SOEs enables the state to 
claim a higher percentage of SOE earnings than it would be entitled to based solely upon its 
ownership stake. As a result, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will dramatically rollback 
or eliminate income taxation of SOEs in the near future. Notably, this also creates a strong 
incentive for the central government to have managers of mixed-ownership SOEs earning only 
domestic income to over-pay enterprise income tax (or at minimum avoid domestic tax planning) 
while limiting dividend payments.293 
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Whatever the underlying rationale, in practice, income tax payments by Chinese SOEs 
greatly overshadow dividend payments. Following tax and SOE reforms of 1993-1994, under 
                                                 
292 See CAO, supra note 95, at 52-53. This withholding rate might be reduced to 5 percent under a limited number 
of bilateral tax treaties. See id. at 285-289. 
293 State and managerial incentives regarding SOE income earned abroad are discussed in Part 5.B, infra. 
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which SOEs were required to pay income taxes,294 SOEs were no longer required to turn over 
dividends or excess-profits to the state and could instead reinvest all post-tax profits across their 
corporate group. This policy reflected the relatively poor financial status and low profits of SOEs 
during the 1990s as the government’s interest at the time was in increasing SOEs autonomy and 
independence. 295  Following its establishment in 2003, SASAC sought the power to collect 
dividends from SOEs. Yet, this plan was delayed by an interdepartmental dispute regarding 
whether SASAC or the Ministry of Finance should have the power to allocate these receipts.296 
Eventually, a compromise payment formula was reached, and in 2007 the government announced 
a pilot program under which SOEs in profitable sectors were required to pay either 10 or 5 percent 
of profits as dividend.297 In 2010-2011 the Ministry of Finance issued a directive increasing these 
requirements to 15 and 10 percent.298 And recently, in 2014 the government again called for 
increasing the dividends of many SOEs in order to make them more attractive to foreign 
institutional investors, with a handful of the most profitable SOEs ordered to pay dividends 
representing 20 percent of profits.299 Despite the recent announcement of special dividends by 
Shenhua Energy and China Mobile—two central SOEs—the overall value of SOE dividends has 
actually declined 4.4 percent from 2014 to 2016, and investors continue to view “low or non-
existent dividends” of central SOEs as “a persistent bug bear.”300 Moreover, the dividend rates of 
                                                 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. 
295 See Louis Kuijs, William Mako & Chunlin Zhang, SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom? (World Bank 
Working Paper No. 56651, 2005), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/961421468243568454/SOE-
dividends-how-much-and-to-whom [https://perma.cc/YFQ5-QPR2].; Naughton, supra note 144, at 59-60; Lan 
Xinzhen, Shaking the SOEs, BEIJING REV. (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-17-e/bus-2.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/ZL7C-M4JS]. 
296 See Lan, supra note 295; Mikael Mattlin, Whose Money?: The Tug-of-War Over Chinese State Enterprise 
Profits (Finnish Inst. Int’l Aff. Briefing Paper 79 2011), 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128535/UPI_Briefing_Paper_79.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRJ7-VYGA]. 
297 SOEs in the tobacco, petroleum, power, telecom, coal, or other monopolized sectors were required to pay 10 
percent, while SOEs in the steel transportation, electronics, trade, construction, or other generally competitive sectors 
were required to pay 5 percent. SOEs in the defense industry were exempt from dividend payments. See XU YI-CHONG, 
SINEWS OF POWER: THE POLITICS OF THE STATE GRID CORPORATION OF CHINA 102 (2016); HOGAN LOVELLS, Central 
Government to Collect Huge Capital Income from Major State-Owned Enterprises (March 26, 2008), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b0609c70-e502-4fd7-bbe7-79773a48bd2b [https://perma.cc/U9AC-
2PX5]. 
298 See Mattlin, supra note 296. 




300 Fox Hu & Moxy Ying, China's Dividend Superstars Mask Stinginess of State Firms, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-28/china-s-dividend-superstars-mask-stingy-reality-for-
state-firms [https://perma.cc/58MK-JWKR]; see also David Keohane, For the Brave China SOE Reform Optimists 
Out There, FIN. TIMES, March, 24, 2017, https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/03/24/2186349/for-the-brave-china-soe-
reform-optimists-out-there/ (discussing the risk of extrapolating from Shenhua’s special dividend); Jennifer Lo, 
Chinese Government is the Biggest Beneficiary of Shenhua's Fat Dividend, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (March 20, 2017), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Markets/Equities/Chinese-government-is-the-biggest-beneficiary-of-Shenhua-s-fat-dividend 
[https://perma.cc/KA39-CMH3] (noting that the Chinese government stands as the largest beneficiary of Shenhua’s 
dividend thanks to SASAC’s 73 percent ownership stake in the Shenhua Group’s parent company). 
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Chinese SOEs remain far below the average dividend rates paid by major U.S. firms or by SOEs 
in other economies.301 
In conclusion, enterprise income taxation of both private enterprises and SOEs is likely to 
remain a core component of Chinese tax policy. Enterprise income taxation remains an important 
source of tax revenue. It enables the government to claim a higher percentage of SOE revenue 
from mixed-ownership enterprises than it would be entitled to based solely upon its ownership 
stake. And despite recent increases in SOE dividend distributions, it remains the primary 
mechanism for transferring SOE revenue to the state.  
B. Maintenance of Worldwide Corporate Taxation 
Having established that enterprise income taxation is likely to remain an important element 
of Chinese tax policy, this Part argues that its unique system of state capitalism may lead China to 
maintain a relatively well-functioning system of worldwide corporate taxation despite an 
international trend toward territorial taxation. In recent years a number of developed countries, 
including the United Kingdom and Japan have reformed their systems of international corporate 
taxation, shifting away from worldwide taxation and closer to territorial taxation. 302  While 
worldwide corporate taxation was once the OECD norm, it has become an outlier.303 Under most 
modern territorial systems, active income earned abroad as well as dividends received from foreign 
subsidiaries are exempted from resident country taxation. In contrast under a worldwide system, 
this income is subject to taxation by the resident country, but a foreign tax credit may be available 
to offset foreign income taxes paid to source countries. Two commonly identified rationales for 
shifting towards a territorial system, is that it minimizes the incentive for corporate inversions and 
it prevents the “lockout” of earnings by foreign subsidiaries.304 First, in order to minimize the tax 
burden on income earned abroad, multinationals whose corporate parent is a tax resident of a 
jurisdiction with a worldwide taxation system may engage in corporate inversions. Through a 
                                                 
 301 See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 23, at 679; Effective Discipline with Adequate Autonomy: The Direction 
for Further Reform of China’s SOE Dividend Policy, World Bank Policy Note Number 53254 (2009), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/358411468024535236/Effective-discipline-with-adequate-autonomy-
the-direction-for-further-reform-of-Chinas-SOE-dividend-policy [https://perma.cc/WLF4-6YDV]; see also Song, 
Yang & Zhang, supra note 26, at 44 (“[B]y 2010, some sectors were handing over 15 percent of dividends to the 
government. In contrast, in some European countries, such as France, Germany and the UK, SOEs are required to turn 
over 50 percent of their profits to the treasury.”); China Plan on Wealth Gap Preserves Much of State Firms’ Cash 
Pile, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-economy-inequality/china-plan-on-wealth-gap-
preserves-much-of-state-firms-cash-pile-idUSL4N0B652T20130207 [https://perma.cc/7S9D-UN6P] (reporting an 
average dividend ratio of “33 percent ratio for 49 SOEs in 16 developed economies between 2000 and 2008” compared 
to ratios of 9.0, 9.4, and 7.3 percent for SASAC controlled SOEs in 2011, 2010, and 2009, respectively). 
302 See Thornton Matheson, Victoria Perry & Chandara Veung, Territorial vs. Worldwide Corporate Taxation: 
Implications for Developing Countries 4 (IMF Working Paper WP/13/205, Oct. 2013), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13205.pdf. [https://perma.cc/D3ZG-2DE9]. 
303  See id.; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL TAX SYSTEMS IN THE OECD (2013), 
http://www.techceocouncil.org/clientuploads/reports/Report%20on%20Territorial%20Tax%20Systems_20130402b.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3SML-J2QV]. 
304 See Matheson, Perry & Veung, supra note302, at 5; see also Eric Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom 
of Larger Tax System Problems, TAX NOTES 1449 (Sept. 17, 2002), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/corporate-
taxation/corporate-inversions-symptom-larger-tax-system-problems/2012/09/17/1209951 (discussing inversions, 
lock-out, and other problems associated with the U.S. system of worldwide corporate income taxation). 
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cross-border merger of the corporate parent with a smaller foreign corporation, the parent may 
transform itself into a tax resident of a jurisdiction with a territorial system, thereby reducing or 
eliminating any additional taxation on the earnings of its subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.305 
Secondly, multinationals whose corporate parent is a resident of jurisdiction with a worldwide 
taxation system may also choose to keep earnings by foreign subsidiaries reinvested abroad rather 
than repatriating this foreign income. By keeping foreign earnings abroad, multinationals can delay 
any additional taxation by the parent’s country of residence, and thus benefit from tax deferral.306 
Shifting towards a territorial system reduces the incentive for resident multinationals to engage in 
these two tax-avoidance practices.307 However, it may also increase their incentive to engage in 
other types of tax-avoidance such as transforming domestic profits into foreign profits through the 
use of transfer pricing or thin capitalization.308 
Thanks in part to its mechanisms of control over SOEs and capital outflows, inversions and 
the lock-out effect are likely to be of much less concern to China than to other countries with more 
free market economies. With SOEs responsible for the majority of Chinese outbound investment, 
the Party-state can leverage its position as controlling shareholder and personnel manager to limit 
outwardly apparent avoidance of Chinese taxation. Firstly, as the controlling shareholder in central 
SOEs, SASAC has the power to veto any SOE merger or restructuring, such as tax-motivated 
corporate inversions, that would undermine public confidence in the integrity of the Chinese tax 
system. Similarly, under the Communist Party’s personnel system, SOE executives would torpedo 
their future career prospects if they sought to engage in a corporate inversion of the group parent 
of a major Chinese SOE, especially in light of the government’s identification of their economic 
success as a point of national pride.309 Secondly, the state has the capability to force SOEs to 
repatriate foreign earnings, thus minimizing any lockout effect. As noted above, the central 
                                                 
305 See Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 313 (2004); Daniel N. Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. 
Corporate Residence (N.Y.U. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 232 2010), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1233&context=nyu_plltwp, [https://perma.cc/U9UJ-H38L]. 
306 See John R. Graham, Michelle Hanlon & Terry J. Shevlin, Barriers to Mobility: The Lockout Effect of U.S. 
Taxation of Worldwide Corporate Profits, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 1111 (Dec. 2010). 
307 See, e.g., Matteo P. Arena & George W. Kutner, Territorial Tax System Reform and Corporate Financial 
Policies, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2250 (2015) (“We find that Japanese and U.K. multinationals accumulate less cash 
overall, invest less abroad, and distribute more cash to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases after the 
adoption of the territorial system in 2009”); Makoto Hasegawa & Kozo Kiyota, The Effect of Moving to a Territorial 
Tax System on Profit Repatriation: Evidence from Japan, 153 J. PUB. ECON. 92 (2017) (“[F]oreign affiliates that 
retained a large stock of retained earnings … before the tax reform significantly increased dividend payments to their 
parent firms in response to Japan's adoption of a territorial tax regime. This implies that the dividend exemption system 
helped to fulfill its primary goal of stimulating dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates that had amassed large 
amounts of foreign profits.”). 
308 See Matheson, Perry & Veung, supra note 302; see also Kevin Markle, A Comparison of the Tax‐Motivated 
Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide Countries, 33 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 7 (2015) (“[O]n 
average, multinationals subject to territorial tax regimes shift more income than those subject to worldwide tax 
regimes.”). 
309  See, e.g., Arnold Ngowani, Lessons from China SOEs, ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL LIMITED, (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/lessons-from-china-soes/ [https://perma.cc/W9A3-Z28Y] (reporting on a Chinese 
organized seminar on SOEs for official from developing countries and noting that Chinese SOEs “constitute the 
foundation of the country’s economy and pride.”)  
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government has imposed dividend requirements on central SOEs.310 Under its authority SASAC 
could impose a similar concomitant requirement that foreign subsidiaries of SOEs pay a minimum 
dividend to group parents. If either SASAC or the Central Organization Department placed a high 
priority on ensuring repatriation of foreign earnings, SOE executives would have little choice to 
comply or risk damaging their career prospects in Party leadership. In short, Party-state’s extensive 
influence over SOE governance can ensure that SOEs do not engage in any disfavored public-
facing tax-avoidance strategies to reduce Chinese income tax paid.  
While the Party-state exerts less direct influence over private enterprises relative to SOEs, 
the current system of capital controls and required regulatory approvals for outbound investments 
may limit the opportunity for private Chinese multinationals to engage in tax-motivated inversions 
or notorious tax-avoidance strategies. According to the Financial Times, the dramatic tightening 
of Chinese capital controls in 2016 caused the cancellation of at least 30 deals between Chinese 
acquirers and U.S. and European targets, worth a total of almost US $76 billion, most of which 
involved private Chinese corporations.311 The fact that these capital controls were imposed silently 
and without warning suggests that government regulators retain significant discretion as to which 
overseas acquisitions to allow to go forward.312 In fact, Thilo Hanemann, an expert on Chinese 
FDI, suggests that in practice, the current system of investment regulations and capital controls, 
“allows the government to control and intervene in every single [outbound cross-border] deal.”313 
As a result, even private Chinese multinationals would likely find it impracticable to engage in 
tax-motivated inversions.314 In contrast private Chinese multinationals are likely to still find it 
advantageous to reinvest overseas profits offshore in order to take advantage of tax deferral. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the SAT has begun employing China’s CFC rules against private 
Chinese companies with overseas operations and is reportedly considering reforms to make these 
rules easier to administer.315 Moreover, if the Party succeeds in its current efforts to have private 
Chinese tech companies give the state “special management shares” and a direct role in corporate 
decision making,316 the state may gain the power to veto blatant attempts to avoid Chinese tax.  
                                                 
310 See supra text accompanying note 297. 
311 See Claire Jones, Javier Espinoza & Tom Hancock, Overseas Chinese Acquisitions Worth $75bn Cancelled 
Last Year, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/b0ff426c-eabe-11e6-930f-061b01e23655.  
312 See supra text accompanying notes 242-243; see also Mitchell & Wildau, supra note 25 (noting the long delay 
between the emergence of Chinese investment curbs and their public recognition by state officials). 
313  Leslie Hook, Chinese Capital Controls Hit Silicon Valley Tech Investors, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e78335e-0152-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. 
314 See, e.g, Jiang Yuesheng [姜跃生], BEPS de Jiazhi Chuangzao Lun yu Zhongguo Quanqiu Jiazhi Fenpei de 
Helihua [BEPS的价值创造论与中国全球价值分配的合理化] (Value Creating Theory Reflected in the BEPS 
Action Plan and How to Obtain Reasonable Share in the Global Value Allocation), 12 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 33, 38 
(2014) [国际税收] (suggesting that Chinese multinationals not be allowed to move their global headquarters out of 
China, no matter how large their overseas sales may later become). 
315 See Wang Haijun, Zhao Hongshun, & Huang Hairong, supra note 123; Mark Melincoe, In China, More 
Advance Rulings, More Cases Going to Court, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 31, 2016), https://www.bna.com/china-
advance-rulings-n57982073273/ [https://perma.cc/NUZ6-J2UT]. 
316 See Li Yuan, Beijing Pushes for a Direct Hand in China’s Big Tech Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2017, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-pushes-for-a-direct-hand-in-chinas-big-tech-firms-1507758314; China's 
Companies on Notice: State Preparing to Take Stakes, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2018), 
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If the Chinese system of state capitalism helps neutralize the two most significant 
drawbacks to a worldwide taxation system, the question now becomes why would the Chinese 
government be interested in maintaining worldwide taxation? Most importantly, worldwide 
taxation would serve to disadvantage private outbound direct investment vis a vis SOE outbound 
investment, thus strengthening the role of the Party in Chinese outbound investment. Moreover, 
worldwide taxation would provide the central government an additional mechanism for shaping 
the geographic and sectoral patterns of Chinese outbound investment. In light of the government’s 
long use of tax law as an instrument for shaping the character of direct investment into China, it is 
likely that Chinese policy-makers intend to have tax law play a similar role as a backstop to its 
regulatory policy regarding foreign outbound investment.317 
In comparison to a worldwide taxation system, a territorial system provides resident 
corporations greater incentive to invest abroad. Since territorial systems do not impose additional 
resident country tax on foreign earnings, investments in foreign low-tax jurisdictions are generally 
subject to lower overall tax under a pure territorial system than under a pure worldwide system.318 
This is particularly relevant to China, as at least two-thirds of the countries along the Belt and 
Road initiative have statutory corporate tax rates below 20 percent, compared with China’s current 
statutory rate of 25 percent, making them low-tax jurisdictions relative to China. 319  Recent 
empirical studies tend to confirm that after shifting from a worldwide to territorial system, 
jurisdictions see an increase in outbound foreign investment by resident corporations.320 While the 
net effects on tax revenue and domestic GDP from transitioning to a territorial system remain a 
                                                 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-17/china-s-communists-will-take-more-stakes-in-private-
companies.  
317 See supra Part. 3.A.; see also He Qian [何倩], Guanyu Guli he Guifan Wogou Qiye Duiwai Touzi Shuishou 
Wenti de Sikao [关于鼓励和规范我国企业对外投资税收问题的思考] (Thoughts on Issues of Taxation Concerning 
Encouraging and Regulating Chinese Enterprises’ Foreign Investments), 10 TAX’N RES. J. 90 (2007) [税务研究] 
(observing that the point of Chinese “going out” initiative is not primarily the economic interest of Chinese enterprises 
but geo-strategic issues and national competitiveness, and thus the tax departments must take active measures to help 
implement the strategy); Wei Cui, “Establishment:” an Analysis of a Core Concept in Chinese Inbound Income 
Taxation, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 46, 77 (2010) (suggesting that “the function of Chinese tax policy toward foreign 
investment” was as a “subordinate instrument to other regulatory policy.”). 
318 See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Moving to a Territorial Income Tax: Options and Challenges, CONG. RES. 
SERV. (July 25, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42624.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PRQ-7P6K], at 16-18 (summarizing 
the literature on the relationship between territorial taxation and the location of investment by multinationals). 
Admittedly, depending on the interest deduction allocation and foreign tax credits limitation rules adopted in 
conjunction with a worldwide system this general pattern may not hold in all cases. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry 
Grubert, Where Will They Go If We Go Territorial? Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. 
Multinational Corporations, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 787 (2001). 
319 See, e.g., Wang Wenjing & Lai Hongyu [王文静 & 赖泓宇], “Yidai Yilu” Zhanlüe de Guoji Shuishou Xietiao 
[“一带一路”战略的国际税收协调] (International Taxation Coordination Under the “Belt and Road” Initiative), 4 
INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 52, 55 (2016) [国际税收]. 
320 See, e.g., Lars P. Feld et al., Effects of Territorial and Worldwide Corporation Tax Systems on Outbound 
M&As (ZEW – Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 13-088, Nov. 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2350755 [https://perma.cc/7FJY-ACL3]; Li Liu, Where Does 
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point of contention among scholars, this debate is centered on the impacts on domestic investment 
from eliminating the lock-out effect and on the substitutability of foreign and domestic 
investment.321 It is not centered on whether territorial taxation provides an additional incentive for 
outbound investment.322  
However, the choice of a worldwide or territorial taxation system is likely to have limited, 
or even reverse, incentive effects on the investment choices of resident SOEs. If acting as a perfect 
fiduciary, a manager of a wholly-owned SOE should be indifferent as to whether or not foreign 
earnings are subject to resident country taxation. The only difference between worldwide and 
territorial taxation for the SOE is when earnings are transferred to state coffers—after earnings are 
subject to source country taxation, all remaining profits belong to the state. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, a perfect fiduciary manager of a mixed-ownership SOE may actually have greater 
incentive to engage in foreign investment under a worldwide system than under a territorial system. 
Under a territorial system, after foreign earnings are subject to source country taxation, SOE 
shareholders have a pro rata claim on all residual profits. In contrast, under a worldwide system, 
foreign earnings may also be subject to resident country taxation, thereby increasing the state’s 
claim on SOE revenue relative to other shareholders.323 Since a worldwide taxation system may 
thus allow a greater portion of SOE earnings to be transferred to the state vis a via private investors, 
a loyal manager seeking to maximize returns for the state may have greater incentive to engage in 
foreign investment under a worldwide system than a territorial system. In sum, the choice between 
a worldwide or territorial system has different incentive effects on perfectly loyal SOEs than on 
private enterprises. 
Yet, in reality, agency problems bedevil the relationship between the Chinese government 
and SOE managers, raising additional questions as to the sensitivity of SOE managers to taxation. 
As noted by Angela Huyue Zhang, due to a combination of agency problems and the Chinese 
government’s desire to grow national champions, managers of Chinese SOEs currently have a 
strong motivation to engage in empire building.324 While the corporate managers of any type of 
enterprise have perverse incentives to engage in some degree of empire building,325 managers of 
Chinese SOEs have additional motivation to increase the size and scope of their SOE—beyond its 
optimal size and at the expense of state revenue—as doing so can bolster the manager’s political 
clout.326 As a result, SOE managers may seek to minimize tax payments to the state through tax 
                                                 
321 Compare Altshuler & Harry Grubert, supra note 318, with James R. Repetti, Will U.S. Investments Go Abroad 
in a Territorial Tax: A Critique of the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 303 (2007). 
322  See, e.g., Philip Dittmer, A Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2012), 
https://taxfoundation.org/global-perspective-territorial-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/4NRS-VP5B] 
 (advocating for adoption of a territorial system in the U.S. while also acknowledging territorial taxation is 
associated with increases in outbound foreign direct investment). 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 293-296. 
324 See Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sense and Sensibility, 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & 
BUS. 395, 442 (2014); see also Mei Wang, Zhen Qi & Jijing Zhang, supra note 115, at 329 (describing Chinese SOEs 
as exhibiting a three tried principal–agent problem, with the nation as the principal, the SOE managers as agent, and 
regulators occupying a middle position). 
325 See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
326 See Zhang, supra note 324， at 445-449. 
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planning in order to retain more resources under their direct control.327 On the other hand, since 
the Party’s evaluation of SOE managers currently prioritizes political allegiance over profitability, 
managers may have a countervailing incentive to ensure an appropriate level of tax payments are 
made to the state.328 The handful of empirical studies assessing domestic tax avoidance by Chinese 
SOEs paints a mixed picture of the principal-agent problem.329 Most but not all studies have found 
Chinese SOEs to have higher effective tax rates than private enterprises, suggesting SOEs practice 
less domestic tax planning.330 Yet, in a nuanced review of the existing scholarship, Wei Cui also 
notes that there is “at least as much evidence” indicating SOEs exhibit some tax planning and 
avoidance as indicating that SOEs are indifferent to taxation.331 Thus it appears that Chinese SOEs 
“behave like ‘real’ taxpayers” to a certain degree but that they are still “less sensitive than private 
firms to paying the home country’s income tax.”332 In other words SOE managers may not engage 
in as much tax-avoidance as private enterprises, but would still prefer to keep funds in corporate 
form rather than in state coffers. 
These observations suggest that in comparison to a more territorial system, maintaining a 
worldwide system of taxation provides a greater disincentive to foreign investment by private 
                                                 
327 SOE managers may attempt to frame this tax-planning as a “win-win result for national interests and corporate 
interests” and argue that by avoiding tax payments in the short-term, they can help grow the SOE and thus increase 
the total amount of state tax revenue in the long run. See, e.g., Cheng Li [程莉], Guoyou Qiye Ruhe Zuohao Shuishou 
Chouhua Gongzuo [国有企业如何做好税收筹划工作] (How State-owned Enterprises Do a Good Job in Tax 
Planning), 553 ACCT. AUDIT 58 (2016) [会计审计]; Lü Min [吕敏], Guoyou Qiye Shifou Ying Jinxing Shuishou 
Chouhua [国有企业是否应进行税收筹划] (Should State-owned Enterprise Engage in Tax Planning?), 236 MODERN 
BUS. (2008) [现代商业]; Song JiaoJiao [宋姣姣], Guoyou Qiye Shuishou Chouhua Zouyi [国有企业税收筹划邹议
] (Discussion of State-owned Enterprise Tax Planning), 262 MONEY CHINA (2012) [财经界] (all offering a similar 
“win-win” justification for domestic tax planning by SOEs). 
328 See supra text accompanying note 203; see also Mark T. Bradshaw, Guanmin Liao, & Mark (Shuai) Ma, 
Ownership Structure and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Agency Costs of State Ownership in China, J. ACCT. & ECON. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239837 [https://perma.cc/9DMG-UJZW] (suggesting that SOE 
managers are rewarded for paying more tax by becoming more likely to be promoted). 
329 See Ji Li, “Strangers in a Strange Land”: Chinese Companies in the American Tax System, 68 HASTINGS J.L. 
503, 533 (2017) (“Recent empirical research on the tax behavior of SOEs has yet to produce conclusive evidence ….”).  
330 See, e.g., Bradshaw, Liao, & Ma, supra note 328, at 2 (finding “SOEs exhibit significantly higher income tax 
rates than do non-SOEs, consistent with less tax avoidance” and concluding “the state utilizes SOE managers’ career 
concerns to promote the minimization of tax avoidance.”); Clemens Fuest & Li Liu, Does Ownership Affect the Impact 
of Taxes on Firm Behavior? Evidence from China (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax’n, Working Paper No. 15/05, 2015), 
http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5428/1/WP1505.pdf [perma.cc/2J5Y-7T52] (finding SOEs to be non-responsive to tax law 
changes and suggesting that the SOEs “do not perceive taxes as costs”); Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, Competition and 
Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms, 119 ECON. J., 764, 794 (2009) (suggesting SOEs 
were less likely to engage in tax avoidance activities than private enterprises); Ming Jian, Wanfu Li & Huai Zhang, 
How Does State Ownership Affect Tax Avoidance? Evidence from China (Sing. Mgmt. Univ., Working Paper No. 13-
18, 2012), https://accountancy.smu.edu.sg/sites/default/files/accountancy/pdf/Papers/huaizhang_2013paper.pdf 
[perma.cc/6JL8-ZW37] (concluding SOEs “avoid tax to a less extent than non-SOEs” and hypothesizing “executives 
at SOEs have incentives to please the government through generous tax payments.”); Tao Zeng, Ownership 
Concentration, State Ownership, and Effective Tax Rates: Evidence from China’s Listed Firms, 9 ACCT.ACCOUNTING 
PERPS. 271, 286 (2011) (finding “firms whose largest shareholders are government-related have higher effective tax 
rates compared to firms whose largest shareholders are nongovernment related” and suggesting that “a good reputation 
of paying more taxes (or avoiding tax aggressiveness) benefits management.”). 
331 Cui, supra note278, at 130. 
332 Cui, supra note 22, at 807-08. 
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enterprises than SOEs. Thus, maintaining a worldwide taxation system would help support the 
Chinese government’s current goals of limiting private capital outflows and enabling SOEs to 
remain the driving force behind Chinese foreign direct investment.333 For these reasons, it appears 
likely that its system of state capitalism, will enable and encourage China to successfully maintain 
a relatively well-functioning system of worldwide corporate taxation. 
C. Tacit State Support for International Tax-Planning  
The dominant role of SOEs in Chinese outbound foreign direct investment creates an 
unusually strong incentive for the Chinese government to encourage SOE managers to minimize 
the amount of foreign taxes paid through tax planning. This point is perhaps best illustrated through 
an idealized example. If through clever tax-planning, a French multinational (or any multinational 
that is a tax resident of a jurisdiction with a territorial system) avoids paying a dollar of tax that 
would otherwise be owed to a foreign jurisdiction on income earned in that foreign jurisdiction, 
this dollar does not directly benefit the French government.334 Since a territorial system does not 
impose tax on the multinational’s foreign income, the French government does not have a tax 
claim on this income. The only benefit to the French fisc comes indirectly—for instance if this 
additional dollar is invested in R&D that later boosts the multinationals’ domestic income. If 
through clever tax-planning, a Mexican multinational (or any multinational that is a tax resident 
of a jurisdiction with a worldwide system) avoids paying a dollar of tax that it would otherwise 
owe to a foreign jurisdiction on income earned in that jurisdiction, this dollar may directly benefit 
the Mexican government, but only to a limited degree.335 At maximum, it stands to impose its 
highest marginal corporate tax rate on the dollar,  currently 30 cents for Mexico .336 Yet, if through 
clever tax-planning a wholly-owned Chinese SOE avoids paying a dollar of tax that it would 
otherwise owe to a foreign jurisdiction on income earned in that foreign jurisdiction, this entire 
dollar benefits the Chinese government. Every dollar of foreign tax avoided by a wholly-owned 
Chinese SOE represents an additional dollar of income to the state. For mixed-ownership SOEs, 
the benefit depends in part on the state’s ownership stake, but in any case, the Chinese government 
stands to capture a greater percentage of the dollar of tax avoided than it would from a private 
enterprise. As a result, China stands to reap significant benefits from foreign tax planning and 
avoidance by SOEs. 
                                                 
333 See supra Parts 4.B and 4.C. 
334 See e.g., SIMÉON MOQUOT BORDE & ASSOCIÉS, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE 13-77 (Matthew Bender ed., 1983) 
(“The scope of application of the French corporate income tax is determined on a territorial basis: thus, a French or 
foreign company is subject to corporate income tax only on its income derived from business operations carried on in 
France (CGI, art. 209(I)(1)).”); see also Overview of the French Tax System, MINISTÈRE DE L’ÉCONOMIE-DIRECTION 
GÉNÉRALEGENERALE DES FINANCES PUBLIQUES (Dec. 31, 2016), 
https://www.impots.gouv.fr/portail/files/media/1_metier/5_international/french_tax_system.pdf [perma.cc/6LGX-
YF4K] (providing an overview of France’s taxing jurisdiction). 
335  See ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 2017 (2017), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_Guide_2017/$FILE/Worldwide%20Corp
orate%20Tax%20Guide%202017.pdf [perma.cc/Z4WF-ER44]. 
336 Depending on the multinational’s situation with respect to foreign tax credit limitations, a reduction in foreign 
income tax paid may not necessarily result in any additional resident country tax owed. See id. at 994 (describing 
Mexico’s foreign tax credit limitation calculation). 
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Yet, recent scholarship suggests that many Chinese SOEs pay relatively little attention to 
international tax planning. Over the past decade, numerous Chinese tax professionals have argued 
that the international tax planning capabilities of Chinese multinationals remain weak and 
underdeveloped and that they must urgently learn from the practices of mature foreign 
multinationals.337 Part of this problem may be tied to the fact that tax management has never been 
an area of focus for most Chinese SOEs. Until recently, both tax authorities and SOE managers 
considered the accurate taxation of SOEs of secondary importance compared to other tax or 
managerial concerns, as it only impacted whether money, already belonging to the state, was 
“placed in the left or right pocket.”338 As a result, SOEs often lack professionals well-versed in tax 
planning and some do not have centralized tax teams capable of developing company-wide tax 
procedures or strategies.339 Moreover, the rigid bureaucracy and hierarchy within major Chinese 
SOEs may hamper their ability to adopt consistent tax planning strategies across corporate 
groups.340 In light of these limitations on SOEs current in-house tax planning capabilities, it is not 
surprising that the first empirical study of Chinese multinationals’ interaction with the U.S. tax 
system found that the vast majority of Chinese multinationals rely on outside U.S. tax professionals 
for handling U.S. tax matters.341 
Recognizing the tax-related challenges faced by Chinese multinationals investing abroad, 
Chinese tax scholars and practitioners have called on the government to provide tax advisory 
services as part of the going out and Belt and Road initiatives. One common suggestion has been 
the creation of a governmental international tax legal aid team able to assist Chinese multinationals 
                                                 
337 See, e.g., Wang Zengye, Wang Jinsong, & Zhang Hui [王增业 ，王劲松, & 张辉], Shui Ji Qinshi he Run 
Zhuan Yidong Jihua dui Zhongguo Qiye Kuaguo Shuishou Chouhua de Yingxiang [税基侵蚀和润转移动计划对中
国企业 跨国税收筹划的影响] (The Impact of Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting on the Transnational Tax 
Planning of Chinese Enterprises), 25 INT’L PETROLEUM ECON. 79, 83 (2017) [国际油经济]; Shen Gengmin [沈庚民
], Shiyou Qiye Guoji Yewu Shuishou Chouhua, [石油企业国际业务税收筹划] (Oil Companies’ International 
Corporate Tax Planning), 15 CHINA MGMT. INFORMATIONIZATION 18 (2012) [中国管理信息化]; Duan Chunyan [段
春燕], Woguo Qiye Jituan de Guoji Shuiwu Chouhua [我国企业集团的国际税务筹划] (International Tax Planning 
for China's Enterprise Groups), 8 CHINA BUS. 73 (2009) [经济理论研究]. 
338 Kong Xiangfeng [孔祥峰], Woguo Guoyou Qiye Shuishou Chouhua de Shuiwu Jianguan Wenti Yanjiu [我
国国有企业税收筹划的税务监管问题研究] (Research on the Tax Supervision of Chinese State-owned Enterprises’ 
Tax Planning), 24 TAX’N 36 (2017) [纳税]. 
339 See id.; Wang Zengye, Wang Jinsong, & Zhang Hui, supra note 337; Ou Jianjun [欧健军], Qiye Jituan Shuiwu 
Fengxian de Neikong Jizhi Tanjiu [企业集团税务风险的内控机制探究 ] (Research on the Internal Control 
Mechanism of Enterprise Group’s Tax Risks), 1 CHINESE J. COM. 94 (2018) [中国商论]; Wang Kun [王琨], Guoyou 
Qiye Zuohao Shuiwu Chouhua Gongzuo de Yanjiu [国有企业做好税务筹划工作的研究] (Research on State-owned 
Enterprises Doing a Good Job in Tax Planning), 9 TIMES FIN. 639 (2016) [时代金融]. 
340 See Wang Kun, supra note 339. 
341 See Ji Li supra note329329329, at 521; see also Gao Yang [高阳], Daxing Guoqi Mianlin de Dianxing Suihou 
Wenti [大型国企面临的典型税收问题] (The Typical Tax Issues Faced by Large State-Owned Enterprises), 6 INT’L 
TAX’N IN CHINA 43, 46 (2014) [国际税收] (reporting the suggestion by the CFO of one Chinese SOE that SOEs 
should periodically consult with international consulting companies to provide tax support to foreign subsidiaries).  
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facing disputes with foreign tax authorities.342 The belief among practitioners is that Chinese 
multinationals investing in developing countries may face a heightened risk of capricious and 
aggressive tax enforcement, as local tax laws and regulations may be underdeveloped and leave 
great discretionary power in the hands of foreign tax authorities. Chinese government experts 
would be well-positioned to offer guidance in such situations, even if official government-to-
government intervention is not required.343 Others have called for a more comprehensive approach. 
For instance, legal scholar Qi Tong has argued that SAT should provide detailed industry-specific 
international tax guidebooks and training sessions for smaller enterprises and should conduct in-
depth tax research for major Chinese multinationals and provide them with specialized and tailored 
international tax advice. 344  Other scholars have suggested that SAT, SASAC, and related 
ministries should establish a specialized international tax management team that not only assists 
SOEs with foreign tax disputes but also provide guidance on overseas mergers, acquisitions, and 
restructurings.345  
Within the past few years, SAT has implemented a number of new programs intended to 
support Chinese enterprises in tax issues related to outbound investment. For instance, in 2016 it 
established an International Tax Service Center and hotline intended to support Chinese enterprises 
engaging in foreign investment by providing tax consulting services.346 Press releases suggest the 
Service Center is intended to be a new platform for “strengthening China’s say on international 
tax matters” while also “serving the state’s development strategy.”347  In October 2017, SAT 
released an over 250 page booklet providing guidelines to Chinese corporations on the taxation of 
outbound investment intended to help reduce their overseas “tax risks.”348 In general, SAT officials 
                                                 
342 See, e.g., Li Wei [李伟], Guanyu Shishi Qiye “Zou Chuqu” Zhanlüe Wenti Yanjiu Zongshu [关于实施企业
“走出去” 战略问题研究综述] (Summary of Research on the Implementation Issues of Enterprises’ “Going Out” 
Strategy), 36 REV. ECON. RES. 45 (2017) [经济研究参考]; see also Gao Yang supra note 341. 
343 See Gao Yang supra note 341; see also Chen Youxiang & Dong Qiang, supra note 134 (noting that in one 
recent survey, 60 percent of the problems faced by Chinese enterprises operating in Africa were related to tax issues, 
and that in another survey 43 percent of Chinese enterprises reported having significant tax-related disputes during 
overseas investment). 
344 See Qi Tong [漆彤], “Yidai Yilu” Zhanlüe de Guoji Shuifa Sikao [“一带一路”战略的国际税法思考] 
(Reflections on the International Tax Law of the “One Belt and One Road” Strategy), 6 TAX’N RES. J. 31, 35 (2015) 
[税务研究]. 
345 See Li Xuhong & Wang Yingqi [李旭红 & 王瑛琦], “Zou Chuqu” Guoyou Qiye Mianlin de Shuiwu Fengxian 
Ji Yingdui [“走出去”国有企业面临的税务风险及应对] (Tax Risks Faced by “Going Out” State-Owned Enterprises 
and Responses) 8 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 34, 36 (2013) [国际税收]. 
346 See China Opens Int'l Tax Service Hotline, XINHUA (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
11/19/c_135841256.htm [https://perma.cc/GU7V-DDTB]. 
347 China's International Taxation Service Hotline Launched in Shanghai, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 18, 
2016), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367751/c2430750/content.html [https://perma.cc/B3AX-NPNF]; Taxation 
Service Big Platform Built to Make the Voice of China, STATE ADMIN. OF TAX’N (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367726/n2367766/c2430535/content.html [https://perma.cc/JW8M-MRCG] 
(describing the services as intended to “offer high-quality and efficient tax consulting services to provide numerous 
cross-border taxpayers with ‘six ables’ services, namely, able to listen, ask, look, inquire, appoint and handle.”).  
348 See “Zou Chuqu” Shuishou Zhiyin [“走出去”税收指引] (“Going Out” Tax Guidelines), STATE ADMIN. OF 
TAX’N (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810744/n1671176/n2884609/c2884646/content.html 
[https://perma.cc/CJM6-6835]. 
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have prioritized maintaining accurate and updated information on the tax policies of major 
destinations of Chinese outbound investment and using the internet and hotline as tools for 
providing better advice to Chinese multinationals on foreign taxation policies.349 Scholars have 
suggested that SAT should continue to build on these programs, so that its international tax experts 
can become a type of “think tank” for enterprises engaging in overseas investment, capable of 
providing tailored tax consultations.350 
Judging solely from the public-facing descriptions of SAT’s International Tax Service 
Center, it is possible that the services currently offered do not extend far beyond those provided 
by other tax authorities. The IRS, for instance, compiles and publishes a summary of the most 
pertinent provisions of U.S. tax treaties in Publication 901. 351  The website of the Indian 
Department of Revenue allows users to select a set of tax treaties and generate interactive 
comparison reports.352 The Australian Taxation Office provides brief informational video clips 
describing the taxation of foreign business income.353 Thus, SAT’s services may simply provide 
basic Chinese international tax information in a convenient format. 
However, in light of the strong incentive for Chinese revenue officials to help ensure that 
Chinese SOEs do not overpay foreign taxes, it is likely that SAT services may shade into tax 
planning. For instance, provincial and local Chinese tax bureaus are reportedly engaging in “one-
on-one” counseling with Chinese multinationals headquartered in their regions providing 
specialized tax advice regarding anticipated foreign investments.354 Other reports indicate that 
local tax departments have assisted major Chinese multinationals in both structuring foreign 
operations to avoid qualifying as a permanent establishment and in qualifying for other types of 
foreign tax emptions.355 In short, SAT official appointed as advisors for Chinese SOEs may not 
only be informing managers of international tax laws, but also suggesting tax-advantaged 
structures and identifying other tax-planning opportunities. This would represent a new front in 
tax-related competition between states. Scholars have traditionally defined tax competition as 
                                                 
349 See Liao Tizhong [廖体忠], Shendu Canyu Guoji Shuishou Hezuo Tuidong “Fang’an” Luodi Shengxiao [深
度参与国际税收合作推动《方案》落地生效] (Implementation of Plan to Promote Increasing Participating in 
International Tax Cooperation), 1 CHINA TAX’N 67 (2016) [中国税]. 
350 Fang Fang & Chen Peihua [方芳 & 陈佩华], Woguo Qiye Jingwai Touzi de She Shui Fengxian Ji Fangfan 
[我国企业境外投资的涉税风险及防范] (Chinese Enterprises Overseas Investment Tax Risks and Prevention), 12 
TAX’N RES. 96 (2017) [税务研究]. 
351 See U.S. Tax Treaties, Pub. 901 (Rev. Sept. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p901 [perma.cc/XTE8-
Z8HE].  
352  See Treaty Comparison, INCOME TAX DEP’T, GOV’T OF INDIA, 
https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/international-taxation/treaty-comparison.aspx [perma.cc/UL3P-ST9H].  
353  See Australians Doing Business Overseas, AUSTRALIAN TAX’N OFF. (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.ato.gov.au/business/international-tax-for-business/australians-doing-business-overseas/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7XD-XFMN].  
354 See Huang Shirui & Li Haiyan [黄诗睿 & 李海燕], Yangfan “Yidai Yilu” Zhuli Zhongguo “Zhi Zao” [扬帆
“一带一路”助力中国“智造”] (Sailing Along “Belt and Road” to Help “Made in China”), 6 CHINA TAX’N 20, 21 
(2016) [中国税务]; see also Zuoke Ailimu & Zhang Zhengtong [佐克·艾力木 & 张正通], Shuishou Zhuli Gu Sichou 
Zhi Lu Chong Fang Yicai [税收助力古丝绸之路重放异彩] (Taxation Helping to Recreate the Ancient Silk Road), 
6 CHINA TAX’N 32, 33 (2017) [中国税务] (reporting that Xinjiang SAT sent a specialized point-person familiar with 
Kazakhstan tax law to assist a Xinjiang-based Steel company in planning for future operations in Kazakhstan). 
355 See Zuoke Ailimu & Zhang Zhengtong, supra note 354, at 33-34. 
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efforts by jurisdictions to attract foreign investment by lowering their tax rates on income earned 
by foreigners.356 Yet, providing support for SOE international tax planning, could place SAT in 
opposition to other tax authorities not only in shaping tax policy, but also in identifying gaps or 
unintended tax plan opportunities within other countries’ international tax laws.  
D. Differential Treatment of SOEs and Private Enterprises 
Chinese international tax policy is likely to provide preferential treatment to SOEs through 
both domestic regulations and international agreements. Chinese domestic tax law has long 
provided preferential treatment to SOEs relative to private enterprises. Initially, this preferential 
treatment was explicit in the form of distinct sets of tax rules.357 Yet, even after implementation of 
the unified Domestic Enterprise Income Tax in 1994, SOEs have continued to receive special tax 
preferences. For instance, from 1994 to 2009, a set of 120 central SOEs were allowed to compute 
tax liability on a consolidated basis—offsetting profits and loses across the group—despite 
Chinese tax law generally prohibiting consolidated returns.358 Similarly, the three major oil and 
gas SOEs have been permitted to apply a preferential set of foreign tax credit rules—an aggregate 
rather than a country-by-country limitation—since 2011, treatment that was only expanded to all 
Chinese enterprises in 2017. 359  Wei Cui argues that such treatment reflects the ability of 
politically-connected SOE executives to successfully lobby for changes to tax regulations.360 In 
light of the high priority placed on SOE participation in the Belt and Road initiative it seems likely 
that Chinese tax regulations will allow for differential treatment between SOEs and private 
enterprises in calculating foreign tax credits or in allowable deferral. 
In fact, international tax preferences for SOEs may be necessary for ensuring the intended 
level of Chinese outbound investment. In general, SOEs should prefer paying a dollar of 
domestic tax rather than a dollar of foreign tax, since domestic taxes go to the state-owner while 
foreign taxes do not. Wei Cui explores possible implications of this fact from the perspective of 
countries seeking to attract inbound SOE investment.361 Yet, this also has implications for 
countries—like China—seeking to encourage outbound SOE investment. Assuming SOEs 
managers are at least partially tax-sensitive,362 SAT could provide an additional incentive for 
certain outbound SOE investment by over-crediting foreign taxes paid. Even if SOE managers 
might prefer paying domestic taxes to paying foreign tax, they are also likely to prefer keeping 
earnings within the SOE than transferring them to the state-owner (through tax or dividends). As 
a result, if foreign taxes paid by SOEs are over credited—with the SOE receiving a greater than 
one-dollar reduction in domestic tax liability for each dollar of foreign tax paid—SOE managers 
will have an additional incentive to make foreign investments. In other words, an overly 
                                                 
356 See, e.g., RIXEN, supra note 39, at 43; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2000). 
357 See supra Part 3.A. 
358 See Cui, supra note 278, at 119. 
359 See id. at 124; supra text accompanying note 137. 
360 See Cui, supra note 278, at 118. 
361 See Cui, supra note 22. 
362 See supra text accompanying notes 324-332. 
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generous foreign tax credit with a marginal reimbursement rate of over 100 percent would 
provide SOE managers greater incentive to invest abroad.363 
Reverse engineering the various I.R.S. efforts to limit the potential adverse revenue 
effects to the U.S. of its foreign tax credit provides a potential blueprint for SAT in crafting a 
more generous foreign tax credit targeted at SOEs. To take one example, the I.R.S. has 
promulgated a complex set of regulations concerning what foreign levies qualify as a foreign 
income tax for the purpose of the foreign tax credit—regulations designed to prevent 
corporations from claiming other overseas business expenses (most notably oil royalty 
payments) as fully creditable foreign taxes.364 Thus, by crafting an over-inclusive definition of 
creditable foreign taxes SAT could lighten the tax burden of Chinese enterprises investing 
overseas.365 In fact, some Chinese scholars have suggested that the Chinese foreign tax credit 
should take into account Chinese multinationals’ non-tax payments made to states with low tax 
transparency and low nominal tax rates, but with high compulsory non-tax levies.366 Providing a 
definition of a foreign income tax that would include types of levies regularly borne by Chinese 
SOEs but not private enterprises, such as natural resource royalties, could provide a targeted 
benefit to SOEs while minimizing the additional economic distortions and negative revenue 
implications of a more expansive foreign tax credit. In sum, Chinese domestic tax law has in the 
past given preferential international tax treatment to SOEs. Going forward, one possibility for 
such preferential treatment is over-crediting the foreign taxes paid by SOEs so as to further 
China’s current foreign policy goal of strengthening its economic influence in the countries 
along the Belt and Road initiative.  
In bilateral tax treaty negotiations, China is also likely to continue to pursue—and 
secure—additional preferential tax treatment for SOEs. In fact, China’s success in expanding the 
number of state-owned financial institutions granted preferential tax treatment in a number of 
recent bilateral tax treaties may serve as a potential model for future negotiations. 
During the first-half of the twentieth century, source countries often unilaterally 
exempted income earned by foreign governments—even if earned in a commercial capacity—
from taxation based on the international law principle of sovereign immunity.367 For instance, 
starting in 1917 the United States provided a broad statutory exemption for income of foreign 
governments received from sources within the United States.368 Until 1946, the exemption was 
                                                 
363 See Daniel Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65 (2011). Shaviro adopts 
the insightful terminology of “marginal reimbursement rate,” to argue against full credibility of foreign taxes and in 
favor of deductibility. However, his analysis is premised on private corporations that are indifferent between paying 
foreign and domestic tax. 
364 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2; see Bret Wells, The Foreign Tax Credit War, 201 BYU L. REV. 1895 (2016). 
365 See Glenn E. Coven, International Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: Crediting Nonconforming Taxes, 4 
FLA. TAX REV. 83, 84 (1999) (noting an over-inclusive description of creditable taxes may result in foreign income 
being taxed more lightly than domestic income). 
366 See Wang Wenjing & Lai Hongyu, supra note 319, at 57.  
367 See generally Matthew A. Melone, Should the United States Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds?, 143 B.U. INT'L 
L.J. 143, 176-89 (2009) (providing a history of the principle of sovereign immunity). 
368 The initial 1917 exemption applied to investments in U.S. stocks, bonds, other domestic securities, and bank 
deposits and was expanded the next year to include income “from any other source within the United States.” See An 
Act to Provide Revenue to Defray War Expenses and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 50, § 1211, 40 Stat. 300, 337 
(1917); An Act to Provide Revenue and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 254, § 213(b)(5), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1918); 
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often interpreted to apply to income earned from commercial activities undertaken by 
corporations wholly-owned by a foreign government.369 For example, in the 1920s, income 
earned by a Maine corporation wholly owned by Nicaragua that operated railways and 
steamships was found to be exempt from U.S. taxation.370 However, after 1946, the I.R.S. “did a 
complete about-face on this issue” and implemented varying tests designed to limit the 
exemption only to income related to governmental functions, making income related to 
commercial activities taxable.371 This reflected a general shift by the United States to a restrictive 
conception of sovereign immunity across all areas of law by 1952 in response to the rise of state 
trading corporations in the post-war era.372 By the 1970s this narrower conception of sovereign 
immunity was adopted by other developed nations.373 As a result, under statutory law OECD 
countries either tax all income earned by foreign governments or exempt only passive income 
not associated with commercial activity.374 A number of Western scholars have argued that the 
remaining exemptions should be further narrowed to ensure that passive investments by foreign 
Sovereign Wealth Funds are taxable.375  
As a result, by the time that China began negotiating its first bilateral tax treaties in the 
early 1980s, its negotiation partners provided only limited exemptions, if any, for income earned 
by government entities. Even today, perhaps reflecting the standard continental European 
practice,376 the text of the OECD and United Nations  model treaties do not include any 
                                                 
see also Melone, supra note 367, at 203-07 (discussing the legislative history of current Internal Revenue Code section 
892). 
369 See Melone, supra note 367, at 204. 
370 See Setser, supra note 283, at 298-99; see also O.D. 182, 1 C.B. 90 (1919); O.D. 515, 2 C.B. 96 (1920); O.D. 
628, 3 C.B. 124 (1920) (all ruling that income earned by a foreign government in the U.S. from commercial operations 
was exempt from U.S. taxation). 
371 See Melone, supra note 367, at 204-05. 
372 See David R. Tillinghast, Sovereign Immunity from the Tax Collector: United States Income Taxation of 
Foreign Governments and International Organizations, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 495, 531 (1978); Sigmund 
Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 109 (1961-1962).  
373 See David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors 10 (OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment 2010/02, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-
2010_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C329-HR5R]; Sally-Ann Joseph, Michael Walpole & Robert Deutch, Taxation of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Suggested Approach, 10 J. Australasian Tax Tchrs. Assoc. 2015 119, 129 (2015); see also 
Tillinghast, supra note 372, at 533 (“If, to take an unlikely example, the government of the U.S.S.R. decided to open 
a plant to distill vodka in Linden, New Jersey, next door to the Gordon's plant, the world would agree it could not 
claim sovereign immunity for that business. The principle of noninterference in the affairs of a sovereign pales in 
importance when the sovereign embarks on a profit-making enterprise within the territory of another sovereign.”). 
374 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ECONOMIC AND U.S. INCOME TAX ISSUES RAISED 
BY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (June 17, 2008), http://www.jct.gov/x-49-
08.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7UG-Z23P] [hereinafter JCT REPORT]; Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign 
Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 469 (2009) (“[T]axing sovereign wealth funds as private corporations is consistent 
with broader international tax policy norms as reflected in the current practice of other countries. The United States is 
alone among its OECD peers in granting categorical, unilateral immunity from taxation for sovereign wealth funds.”). 
375 See, e.g., Jennifer Bird-Pollan, The Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Foreign Sovereign 
Tax Exemption, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 987 (2012); Fleischer, supra note 374. 
376 Under domestic law Germany, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland do not exempt foreign governments from 
taxation. In bilateral treaties Germany never provides an exemption to foreign governments, and most other continental 
European countries do exceedingly rarely. See JCT REPORT, supra note 374, at 77-78, A-3; Gaukrodger, supra note 
373, at 33. 
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provision exempting interest or dividend income earned by foreign governments from taxation, 
and their respective commentaries were only recently updated to acknowledge an alternative 
practice amongst some nations.377 Similarly, the current U.S. model treaty does not provide for 
any such exemptions.378 Admittedly, since the U.S. abolished its withholding tax on certain 
portfolio interest income in 1984,379 a number of OECD states have eliminated withholding tax 
on interest, making a treaty exemption for government interest portfolio unnecessary in some 
cases.380 However, even these countries generally retain withholding tax on dividends.381 
Moreover, most developing countries retain withholding taxes on both interest and dividends, as 
they are simple and easy to collect.382 In their tax treaties, the maximum rates for interest and 
dividend withholding taxes are usually 10% or 15%.383 
In negotiating bilateral tax treaties, China, like a number of other developing nations, has 
fought to include a non-standard provision ensuring the exemption of interest payments made to 
                                                 
377 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Nov. 21, 
2017), Commentary on Art. 10 ¶ 13.2 (“[S]ome States refrain from levying tax on dividends paid to other States and 
some of their wholly-owned entities, at least to the extent that such dividends are derived from activities of a 
governmental nature.”); Commentary on Art. 11 ¶ 7.4 (“Some States refrain from levying tax on income derived by 
other States and some of their wholly-owned entities (e.g. a central bank established as a separate entity), at least to 
the extent that such income is derived from activities of a governmental nature”); see also UNITED NATIONS, Model 
Double Taxation Convention (2011), Commentary on Art. 10 ¶ 13 (quoting the OECD commentary); Commentary 
on Art. 11 ¶¶ 12-16 (quoting the OECD commentary). For a detailed discussion of the debates concerning the 
appropriate taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which led to the adoption of these provisions in the OECD 
Commentary (and subsequently the UN Commentary), see Stijn Janseen, How to Treat(y) Sovereign Wealth Funds? 
The Application of Tax Treaties to State-owned Entities, Including Sovereign Wealth Funds, in THE 2010 OECD 
UPDATES: MODEL TAX CONVENTION & TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES - A CRITICAL REVIEW 185 (Dennis Weber & 
Stef van Weeghel eds., 2011). 
378  See United States Model Income Tax Convention (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE8M-CN8G]; see also Tillinghast, 
supra note 372, at 526 (“Only a handful of the income tax treaties to which the United States is a party make any 
special provision with respect to income received by the respective governments involved, and those that do relate 
only to interest payments.”). 
379 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494, 648-50 (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 871(h)).  
380 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 356, at 1581-82. 
381  See id.; DELOITTE, WITHHOLDING TAX RATES 2018 (2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-withholding-tax-rates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TG6S-CKGD]. 
382 See Khadija Baggerman-Noudari & René Offermanns, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: 
Some Tax Considerations and Other Related Legal Matters, BULL. INT’L TAX’N 310, 315 (June 2016); DELOITTE, 
WITHHOLDING TAX RATES 2018, supra note 381 (suggesting an average withholding). 
383 See id.; Ariane Pickering, Tax Treaty Policy Framework and Country Model (Papers on Selected Topics in 
Negotiation of Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, Paper No. 2-N, May 2013), 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2013TMTTAN/Paper2N_Pickering.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3HJ-SV8E]; see also Zhao 
Shubo [赵书博], Woguo yu “Yidai Yilu” Yanxian Guojia Shuishou Xieding Wenti Yanjiu [我国与“一带一路”沿线
国家税收协定问题研究] (A Study on the Tax Treaties Between China and the Countries Along the “Belt and Road”), 
397 TAX’N RES. J. 74 (2018) [税务研究] (noting the maximum withholding rate in China’s tax treaties with countries 
along the Belt and Road initiative ranges between 10 and 20 percent). 
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the state or certain government entities from source countries withholding taxation.384 Since 
China’s first bilateral tax treaty with Japan, its treaties have often included a broad provision 
exempting not only interest payments to the contracting parties’ governments, local authorities, 
and central banks but also to wholly government owned financial institutions.385 For instance, all 
of China’s bilateral tax treaties with European countries contain this exemption in some form, 
and in most treaties this exemption extends to wholly owned financial institutions.386 Similarly, 
51 out of China’s 56 bilateral tax treaties with 56 countries along the Belt and Road initiative 
contain an exemption that extends to government owned financial institutions.387 Thus, in its 
international tax diplomacy, China has generally succeeded in having foreign nations accord its 
central bank and policy banks an exemption from taxation on interest. 
While interest exemptions for wholly government owned financial institutions do not 
represent a major departure from common bilateral treaty practice—many African countries now 
include them in their bilateral treaties388—China’s most recent treaties take a much bolder step, 
exempting interest income earned by certain Chinese commercial banks. As noted above, the 
major Chinese commercial banks were once wholly government owned institutions but are now 
publicly-listed corporations with minority private investment and a complicated hybrid 
character.389 As a result, interest payments on foreign securities made to the major Chinese 
commercial banks may be subject to withholding taxation under most Chinese bilateral tax 
treaties. Yet, China’s 2016 treaties with Cambodia and Romania ensure preferential tax treatment 
for China’s major commercial banks by broadening the government interest exemption to 
include financial institutions with more than 50% government ownership.390 A protocol to the 
                                                 
384 Developing countries may include these “government interest” provisions as they indicate strong respect for 
the sovereignty of another state and avoid the imposition of tax on interest payments connected to state-sponsored 
export promotion or development aid. See DAURER, supra note 34, at 275-76. 
385 See Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, China-Japan, art. 11, Sept. 6, 1983,  
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810770/c1153042/part/1153044.pdf [https://perma.cc/6438-2JH7] (“[I]nterest 
arising in a Contracting State and derived by the Government of the other Contracting State, a local authority thereof, 
the Central Bank of that other Contracting State or any financial institution wholly owned by that Government … 
shall be exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting State.”); see also United States-The People’s Republic of 
China Income Tax Convention, China-U.S., art. 10, Apr. 30, 1984, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/china.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VW2E-KE8W] (including a nearly identical provision). 
386 See Bernhard Canete, Bristar Mingxing Cao & Yun Huang, Passive Income (Article 10, 11, and 12 OECD 
Model), in EUROPE-CHINA TAX TREATIES, supra note 13, at 121-33. 
387 See Zhao Zhou & Zhang Li [赵洲 & 张丽], Lun “Yidai Yilu” Kuajing Lixi Suode de Shuishou Xietiao [论“一
带一路”跨境利息所得的税收协调] (Tax Coordination on Cross-border Interests in Countries Along the “Belt and 
Road” Initiative), 1 INT’L TAX’N IN CHINA 51, 52 (2018) [国际税收]; see also Zhao Shubo, supra note 383, at 74 
(discussing the interest income exception for wholly government owned financial institutions in China’s bilateral tax 
treaties with Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, Oman and Turkmenistan). 
388 See DAURER, supra note 34, at 275-76. 
389 See supra text accompanying notes 179-185. 
390 See Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, Cambodia-China, art. 11.3, Oct. 13, 2016 , 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367756/c2367970/part/2367982.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4P5-3KAZ] [hereinafter 
China-Cambodia Tax Treaty] (“[I]nterest arising in a Contracting State and paid to the Government or a local authority, 
the Central Bank or any financial institution or statutory body mainly owned by the Government of the other 
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treaty with Cambodia confirms that China’s four largest commercial banks qualify for this 
exemption.391 Chinese officials have stated that they hope the new stipulations regarding tax 
exemption “set a good example of improving fundamentals of law for tax cooperation between 
China and other Belt and Road countries.”392 A new protocol to the tax treaty with Pakistan that 
came into force in April 2017 granted an exemption on interest received by the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China derived from loans associated with energy projects that are part of a 
US $47 billion infrastructure plan.393 According to news reports from Pakistan, Chinese officials 
were insistent in expanding the scope of the exemption despite Pakistan’s reluctance.394 
Chinese tax scholars have noted that this exemption plays a particularly important role 
for reducing the foreign tax burden on overseas infrastructure construction undertaken by 
Chinese engineering firms. Many infrastructure projects on the Belt and Road initiative are being 
constructed by Chinese engineering corporations and are being funded through loans made by 
China’s policy or commercial banks.395 In fact, by one estimate, out of all contractors 
participating in Chinese-funded projects, 89 percent are Chinese and only 7.6 percent are local 
companies.396 Without the government interest provision, interest payments from a foreign 
branch or subsidiary of a Chinese construction corporation to a Chinese financial institution 
would generally be subject to withholding tax by the host country. Since these loans have 
traditionally been tax-inclusive (with withholding income tax payable on the interest borne by 
                                                 
Contracting State, shall be exempt in the first-mentioned State. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘mainly 
owned’ means the ownership exceeds 50 per cent.”); see also Agreement for the Elimination of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and the Prevention of Tax Evasion and Avoidance, China-Rom., art. 11.3, July 4, 2016,  
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367756/c2367985/part/2367997.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VPV-96DN] (similar). 
391 These are the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank and 
the Agricultural Bank of China. See China-Cambodia Tax Treaty, supra note 390, ¶ 3.b. 
392 See China-Romania Tax Treaty Signed by Wang Qinfeng on Behalf of China, STATE ADMIN. OF TAX’N (Sept. 
9, 2016), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367726/c2369301/content.html [https://perma.cc/5KCP-SESU]. 
393 See The Third Protocol to the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, China-Pak, art.1, Dec. 8, 2016, 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810770/c1153236/part/2728748.pdf [https://perma.cc/298Y-79GY] (“For the 
provisions of Article 1 of the Second Protocol, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Silk Road Fund 
are included as “State Banks”, but only for the purpose of interest income they derive from loans in Pakistan for the 
Energy Projects mentioned in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Energy Projects Cooperation Agreement signed 
at Beijing on November 8 , 2014.”); see also Katherine Houreld, China and Pakistan Launch Economic Corridor 
Plan Worth $46 Billion, REUTERS (April 20, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-china/china-and-
pakistan-launch-economic-corridor-plan-worth-46-billion-idUSKBN0NA12T20150420 [https://perma.cc/QQ74-
SK9] (describing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). 
394 See Shahbaz Rana, Pakistan, China Divided over Tax Exemptions, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (March 10, 2016), 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1062662/loans-for-cpec-projects-pakistan-china-divided-over-tax-exemptions/ 
[https://perma.cc/VDP9-54CH]. 
395 See, e.g., Peng Qinqin & Denise Jia, China State Banks Provide over $400 Bln of Credits to Belt and Road 
Projects, CAIXIN (May 11, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-05-12/101089361.html 
[https://perma.cc/FKK6-U5QV]; see also Kane Wu & Julie Zhu, Exclusive: China's ‘Big Four’ Banks Raise Billions 
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the borrowing company), the tax savings under this bilateral treaty provision may primarily 
benefit the Chinese engineering corporations.397 Two recently settled disputes between China 
and foreign jurisdictions involving the imposition of withholding tax on interest payments from 
overseas subsidiaries of Chinese enterprises to Chinese wholly state-owned institutions, suggests 
that Chinese tax officials are prioritizing enforcement of these provisions.398 Moreover, 
expanding the exemption to apply to Chinese commercial banks, appears to be of significant 
economic value to China. Estimates suggest that the protocol with Pakistan may reduce the 
foreign tax burden on Chinese corporations by US $2 billion399 and all of the expanded 
government interest exemptions negotiated in 2016 may reduce the foreign tax burden by 
roughly US $4 billion.400 In sum, by negotiating for an exemption on withholding taxes imposed 
on interest payments to state-owned financial institutions, China has significantly reduced the 
foreign taxes owed on overseas infrastructure projects thus benefiting major SOEs. Moreover, 
the recent expansions of this exemption to include some of China’s mixed-ownership 
commercial banks, illustrates China’s willingness to challenge the status quo regarding the 
international taxation of state-owned institutions and may serve as a possible model for further 
expanded exemptions in the future.  
Similarly, China’s recent bilateral tax treaties with the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and 
Switzerland, suggest that it is also now seeking additional preferential tax treatment for SOEs in 
the form of an exemption from dividend withholding taxes. Most OECD countries retain 
significant withholding taxes on dividends payments to portfolio investors but apply a reduced 
withholding rate to dividend payments made by a subsidiary to parent corporation.401 These three 
updated treaties, all of which were entered into force in 2013, contain similar provisions 
exempting dividend payments from withholding tax if “the beneficial owner of the dividends” is 
the government, a government institution, or “any other entity the capital of which is wholly 
owned directly or indirectly” by the government.402 Under this provision, dividend payments 
                                                 
397 See Zhao Shubo, supra note 383; see also Qi Tong, supra note 344 (discussing the role of bilateral tax treaties 
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[国际税收]; see also Better Reassure Enterprises Going Global, supra note 397 (noting that interest exemptions 
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from a Dutch, U.K., or Swiss resident corporation to a wholly-owned Chinese SOE are exempt 
from withholding tax, no matter the level of SOE investment. Commentators have noted that 
these exemption provisions are quite attractive for wholly-owned Chinese State-owned 
enterprises, as they provide tax-preferred treatment to dividends not only from their subsidiaries 
but from any of their portfolio holdings.403 The willingness of these three countries to adopt a 
treaty provision intended to provide preferential tax treatment for wholly-owned Chinese SOEs, 
proves that even developed nations may be willing to forego significant tax revenue from 
Chinese SOEs in the hope of increased Chinese investment leading to job creation. 404 
Thus, recent Chinese bilateral tax diplomacy, suggests that it will continue to seek to 
broaden exemptions from source country withholding taxation for state-owned financial 
institutions and SOEs. Exemptions from interest payments to state commercial banks can 
significantly reduce the financing costs for Chinese SOEs operating in developing countries. 
Exemptions from dividend payments to SOEs can reduce the tax-cost of operating subsidiaries in 
countries without a full treaty exemption for subsidiary-parent dividend payments and of making 
portfolio investment in countries with dividend withholding. Going forward, it seems likely that 
China will also seek to expand the dividend exemption to mixed-ownership SOEs (for instance 
through adoption of the 50 percent threshold, like that found in recent government interest 
provisions). Moreover, it is possible that in negotiations with developing countries, China may 
even push for exemptions for certain types of active income earned by SOEs (for instance, 
income associated with state-sponsored infrastructure projects), reviving earlier conceptions of 
state sovereign immunity with respect to tax. Lobbying for an exemption for SOEs from all 
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foreign taxation, would in fact be in line with China’s general support for broad and absolute 
sovereign immunity in other legal contexts.405 
While China is likely to continue to seek preferential treatment for SOEs in bilateral 
treaties, some countries may choose to unilaterally exempt certain income earned by SOEs from 
taxation in hope of attracting Chinese investment. Currently the United States and United 
Kingdom generally exempt from taxation passive investment income earned by foreign 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), a close relative of SOEs.406 SWFs are state-owned and 
controlled funds that make investments in foreign assets and are dedicated to achieving national 
macroeconomic and financial objectives.407 Australia and Canada may exempt passive income 
earned by SWFs provided the fund first establish its eligibility through administrative procedures 
and some additional countries offer such treatment through bilateral treaty provisions.408 While 
the appropriate international tax treatment of SWFs remains highly controversial, scholars have 
demonstrated that exempting passive income earned by SWFs can incentivize additional 
sovereign investment under certain conditions.409 Building on these findings, John McLaren has 
argued that both foreign SWFs and SOEs should be exempted from paying Australian tax on 
income earned from passive investments as it would benefit the country economically by 
signaling Australia’s openness to greater foreign investment from China.410 Wei Cui has noted 
more generally that there are many possibilities for host countries to offer “select incentives to 
foreign SOEs to make greater investments” without fear of placing private investors at a 
disadvantage.411 These scholars focus their work on Western developed countries and 
acknowledge that in light of current geopolitics, offering tax inducements to Chinese SOEs may 
be politically unpalatable in Australia, the United States, and Canada.412 However, their 
                                                 
405 See e.g., Ferdous Rahman, Questioning Chinese Government’s Stand for Sovereign Immunity, 9 TRANSNAT’L 
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arguments regarding increased investment may be most relevant to developing countries—which 
often have higher corporate tax rates and great need for foreign investment. 
These observations suggest the possibility of a type of tax competition amongst countries 
seeking Chinese investment. Since major overseas Chinese investments are often dictated by 
SOEs and state-owned commercial banks, developing countries seeking to attract Chinese 
investment may offer generous tax exemptions to such enterprises premised upon their state-
ownership. By offering exemptions premised upon state-ownership rather than across-the-board 
reductions in withholding or corporate tax rates, they may be able to incentivize additional 
Chinese investment without significantly lowering their overall tax revenue. Moreover, Chinese 
government officials may be particularly supportive of this approach since it would stand to 
benefit the Chinese government (a reduction in the foreign tax imposed on Chinese SOEs leaves 
greater earnings for the state) with less risk of sparking a more generalized “race to the bottom” 
amongst developing countries over tax rates—which could harm China’s own efforts to 
encourage foreign investors to continue reinvesting in China.413 Additionally, it could put SOEs 
at an economic advantage in comparison to other foreign multinationals operating in the same 
host country. Thus, from the perspective of Chinese tax policy makers, creating competition to 
pressure countries along the Belt and Road initiative to offer the most generous tax exemptions 
for state-owned enterprises may be an ideal tax policy: it benefits the Chinese fisc, places 
Chinese emperies at a competitive advantage in host countries, and does not place China at a 
disadvantage in terms of attracting its own foreign investment. 
VI. Conclusion 
With China set to assume meaningful influence over the international tax regime, its unique 
system of state capitalism is likely to cause its preferred international tax rules and norms to differ 
significantly from those of OECD countries. Maintenance of a worldwide system of taxation, state 
support for SOE international tax planning, and advocacy for broad tax exemptions for SOEs are 
only some of many possible areas of divergence. For instance, in the highly-technical field of 
transfer pricing China has also been challenging aspects of the OECD consensus on arm’s length 
pricing.414 Chinese scholars suggest that changing the transfer pricing rules related to intangible 
assets may help foster the development of Chinese multinationals, whose economic advantages 
primarily come from maintaining low production costs rather than from innovative intellectual 
property.415 Of course, numerous other divergences in tax preferences may not be directly related 
to China’s system of state capitalism, but rather to its status as a developing country. For example, 
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China, like a number of other developing countries, has controversially attempted to impose tax 
on indirect transfers of taxable Chinese property by foreign shareholders, in other words, transfers 
of shares in offshore holding companies holding primarily Chinese assets. 416  In short, going 
forward China tax-policy makers are likely to push back against OECD tax norms on multiple 
fronts. 
It is tempting for OECD countries to assume that China’s involvement in BEPS and future 
multilateral initiatives will temper and contain most of China’s potentially heterodox international 
tax preferences. Yariv Brauner has observed that even within the context of the BEPS projects, 
there are many subtle signs that the OECD nations wish to maintain greater power over 
international tax norms than the BRIC countries, despite their supposedly equal status within 
BEPS.417 Thus, the give-and-take of multinational diplomacy may create pressures for China to 
broadly adhere to prevailing OECD norms, even if it may continue to push for changes around the 
edges. For instance, during BEPS negotiations, Chinese tax officials proposed new transfer pricing 
methods that seemed to represent a major departure from the OECD consensus.418 Yet, following 
the completion of BEPS, China now appears to have moved much “closer to OECD orthodoxy” 
in its transfer pricing regulations even if its regulations also contain a few “China-unique concepts” 
that are “at variance with OECD.”419 This may suggest that even if Chinese state capitalism creates 
a divergent set of international tax preferences, these will be neutralized through the consensus-
building process of multinational negotiations. 
However, China’s audacious Belt and Road initiative may allow it to gradually push for 
new international tax norms through a regional—rather than global—approach that may sidestep 
the influence of OECD countries. Official state documents regarding the Belt and Road initiative 
emphasize that it is “open to all countries” and “not limited to the area of the ancient Silk Road.”420 
However, Chinese scholars and government-associated think tanks have identified 65 or so 
countries associated with the initiative, the vast majority of which are non-OECD members.421 
                                                 
416 See, e.g., Wei Cui, Taxing Indirect Transfers: Improving an Instrument for Stemming Tax and Legal Base 
Erosion, 33 VA. TAX REV. 653, 654-55 (2014). 
417 See Brauner, supra note 12, at 1025-26 (suggesting the BRICS participation in BEPS has allowed the OECD 
to accept some changes in international tax norms “without a significant effective concession of power by the OECD 
itself.”); see also Brauner, supra note 9, at 78 (observing that the BEPS action item 5 on harmful tax practices 
awkwardly recreates an “us” and “them” dynamic between OECD and non-OECD countries and suggesting that such 
language “hints that the OECD still views itself primarily as the rich countries’ club.”). 
418 See Kevin A. Ball, China Backs Down on Adopting Controversial Transfer Pricing Method, BLOOMBERG 
BNA, (April 19, 2017), https://www.bna.com/china-backs-down-n57982086872/ [https://perma.cc/4DVT-5M6C]. 
419  Glenn DeSouza, China’s New Transfer Pricing Platform and the Challenge for U.S. Multinationals, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 3, 2017), https://www.bna.com/chinas-new-transfer-n73014460766/ 
[https://perma.cc/PSU3-72GQ]. 
420 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, NAT’L 
DEV. & REFORM COMMISSION (Mar. 28, 2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html 
[https://perma.cc/4MVY-UNQU]. 
421  See Hellen Chin & Winnie He, The Belt and Road Initiative: 65 Countries and Beyond, FUNG BUS. 
INTELLIGENCE CTR. (May 2016), 
https://www.fbicgroup.com/sites/default/files/B%26R_Initiative_65_Countries_and_Beyond.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S97W-38UD]; see also Wang Wenjing & Lai Hongyu, supra note 319 (discussing the political and 
economic characteristics of countries along the Belt and Road initiative). 
 
138                                                                                                                                         [Vol.10:1 
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW 
Through the initiative, China is poised to be become the dominant economic player across Central 
and Southeast Asia.422 As a result, China will likely be able to leverage its role as the primary 
source of foreign capital investment for most countries along the initiative to push for new 
international tax norms. Multiple Chinese scholars have suggested that China can use its economic 
influence along the Belt and Road initiative to develop new regional tax rules or even a 
comprehensive regional tax agreement. After first shaping new international tax rules along the 
Belt and Road countries, China will then be able to more strongly influence international tax law 
around the globe.423 Cao Mingxing of the Central University of Economics and Finance has even 
suggested that China can use the Belt and Road as a basis for a new international tax reform 
strategy of “neo-BEPS” (Base Expansion and Profit Sharing) which would embrace more 
substantive changes to international tax regime than the narrow and “neo-liberal” changes of 
BEPS.424 These observations indicate China’s recent tax treaties with Romania and Cambodia are 
likely only the beginning of Chinese efforts to negotiate for new and potentially heterodox tax 
rules with countries along the Belt and Road initiative.  
In conclusion, as China gains greater influence in shaping the international tax regime, its 
preferences for international tax rules are likely to be heavily shaped by its system of state 
capitalism. Just as Chinese domestic tax policy reforms have been driven by the central 
government theories of industrial planning and SOE governance, Chinese international tax policy 
will be designed to help China’s current national champion SOEs grow into global champions. As 
a result, tax policy-makers in both OECD countries and those along the Belt and Road must remain 
cognizant of the fact that due to its unique economic system, China may pursue tax policies and 
norms orthogonal to the traditional battle lines between developed and developing countries. To 
take just one example, tax treaty provisions defining tax exempt government entities—relatively 
inconsequential for the vast majority of treaties between free market economies—may become the 
next flashpoint in international tax diplomacy. To prevent such disputes from fracturing the 
international tax regime, new international agreements may be required concerning the appropriate 
tax treatment of state-owned entities and the appropriate boundaries for assistance offered by state 
tax administration to domestic corporations. Policy-makers must be proactive in recognizing and 
addressing the challenges to the current international tax system posed by future Chinese 
international tax policies motivated by state capitalism. 
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